By Lara Friedman

August 30, 2010

Foreign Policy

With the resumption of Israeli-Palestinian talks this week and the approaching September 26^thexpiration of the settlement moratorium, the settlements issue is set to once again take center stage.

Last week, in an otherwise excellent article, former US Ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk suggested that this need not be a crisis. He stated that “there could be a workable compromise if Mr. Netanyahu restricts building to modest growth in the settlement blocs that will most likely be absorbed into Israel in the final agreement, while offering changes that would make a real difference to West Bank Palestinians…”

The following day, Haaretz’s Aluf Benn offered a similar observation as he laid out the popular wisdom regarding what can be expected from Prime Minister Netanyahu. Benn stated that “Everyone agrees the sweeping construction freeze cannot be continued and that the large settlement blocs should be distinguished from the isolated settlements beyond the separation fence. Construction will resume in the blocs and be frozen in the isolated settlements–or continue on a small scale.”

This narrative is highly attractive to analysts and pundits because it is simple to articulate, sounds reasonable, and offers an easy answer to the question: how can Netanyahu possibly continue the settlement moratorium? The answer? He doesn’t have to.

Unfortunately, this narrative has two huge flaws.

First, it makes sense only if you ignore the inconvenient realities on the ground. Today, it is generally argued that Israel’s West Bank barrier defines the settlement blocs. But the built-up area of the settlements on the “Israeli” side of the barrier is only around 7,300 acres, while the barrier de facto annexes an area nearly 20 times that size — around 148,000 acres. Construction within these 148,000 acres directly threatens the viability of the two-state solution.

Take, for example, the “Ma’ale Adumim bloc,” which includes the site of the planned mega-settlement of E1 — a settlement whose construction is potentially fatal to the two-state solution. Or the “Givat Ze’ev bloc”, where the barrier route extends so far north that it reaches the very edge of Ramallah. Or the “Etzion bloc,” where the barrier extends deep into the West Bank, transforming Bethlehem into an isolated enclave.

Some will argue that construction in blocs could be limited to the built-up areas of settlements (sometimes referred to as building “up” or vertical construction), but as chronicled by former US Ambassador to Israel Dan Kurtzer, this is a trap. While it may sound reasonable to agree that settlers can continue to build inside settlements, so long as settlements aren’t “expanding”, achieving agreement on what it means to build “inside” a settlement versus “expanding” a settlement has proven impossible, allowing settlements to keep growing while the US and Israel bicker. Today’s peace effort is too important to waste time re-visiting this dead-end approach.

Second, this narrative suggests that settlements, not negotiations, will decide final borders.

This is not a good-faith way to re-start talks. Rather, it is the latest abuse of the “everybody knows” argument (an argument well-known for its use in defense of Israeli settlement construction in East Jerusalem). In effect, the argument is that “what is within the blocs (or inside the barrier) will be Israeli, and the rest is still up for grabs.” This approach contradicts not only what Israel and the Palestinians have previously agreed to, but also the position of every US Administration.

Supporters of settlements often abuse President Bush’s April 14, 2004 letter to Ariel Sharon, in which President Bush stated that “In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.” They seem to forget that in the preceding sentence President Bush stated that any agreement to this effect “should emerge from negotiations between the parties” and in the next sentence added the caveat that “any final status agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities“[emphasis added].

Based on past negotiations, including the unofficial Geneva Initiative, it seems likely in the context of a negotiated peace agreement that Palestinians will agree to Israel retaining control of some settlements — most likely those that are today part of so-called settlement blocs. This is an important principle that, along with the evacuation of all other settlements and land swaps of equal size and quality, could pave the way for a viable permanent status agreement. However, it is disingenuous to cherry-pick this principle in order to justify new settlement construction outside the context of such negotiations and absent a peace agreement.

The soon-to-expire 10-month settlement moratorium included so many exceptions that it has had little visible impact on the ground. Construction in settlements has continued apace, as has planning and other preparation for new construction; violations of the moratorium are rampant; and the government of Israel, rather than taking steps to deal with illegal outposts, has engaged in efforts to legalize some. Indeed, the moratorium has had so little impact that today Arutz Sheva, the settlers’ new outlet, reported that “the number of Jews in Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] rose by over 2.5% in the first half of 2010…according to Interior Ministry statistics. An increase of 8,000 Jews in the first half of 2010 was registered in the Population Registry of the Interior Ministry–a growth rate nearly three times that of the rest of Israel.”

Today, swapping this incomplete moratorium for new rules of the game permitting construction within so-called settlement blocs would directly threaten the prospects for a peace agreement on the ground. It would undermine President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad, who reject violence and tell their people that negotiations with Israel are the correct way forward. It would signal that the Netanyahu government is not serious about peace. And it would deal a body blow to the Obama Administration’s credibility as a steward of the peace process.

Middle East peace efforts are not served by narratives — attractive as they may be — that delude anyone into believing that Israel can avoid the hard decisions it must make on settlements.

By Ali Abunimah

August 28, 2010

New York Times

At an Aug. 20 news conference with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, announcing the talks that will begin this week, Mr. Mitchell reminded journalists that during difficult negotiations in Northern Ireland, “We had about 700 days of failure and one day of success” — the day in 1998 that the Belfast Agreement instituting power-sharing between pro-British unionists and Irish nationalists was signed.

Mr. Mitchell’s comparison is misleading at best. Success in the Irish talks was the result not just of determination and time, but also a very different United States approach to diplomacy.

The conflict in Northern Ireland had been intractable for decades. Unionists backed by the British government saw any political compromise with Irish nationalists as a danger, one that would lead to a united Ireland in which a Catholic majority would dominate minority Protestant unionists. The British government also refused to deal with the Irish nationalist party Sinn Fein, despite its significant electoral mandate, because of its close ties to the Irish Republican Army, which had carried out violent acts in the United Kingdom.

A parallel can be seen with the American refusal to speak to the Palestinian party Hamas, which decisively won elections in the West Bank and Gaza in 2006. Asked what role Hamas would have in the renewed talks, Mr. Mitchell answered with one word: “None.” No serious analyst believes that peace can be made between Palestinians and Israelis without Hamas on board, any more than could have been the case in Northern Ireland without Sinn Fein and the I.R.A.

The United States insists that Hamas meet strict preconditions before it can take part in negotiations: recognize Israel, renounce violence and abide by agreements previously signed between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, of which Hamas is not a member. These demands are unworkable. Why should Hamas or any Palestinian accept Israel’s political demands, like recognition, when Israel refuses to recognize basic Palestinian demands like the right of return for refugees?

As for violence, Hamas has inflicted a fraction of the harm on Israeli civilians that Israel inflicts on Palestinian civilians. If violence disqualifies Hamas, surely much greater violence should disqualify the Israelis?

It was only by breaking with one-sided demands that Mr. Mitchell was able to help bring peace to Northern Ireland. In 1994, for instance, Mr. Mitchell, then a Democratic senator from Maine, urged President Bill Clinton — against strenuous British objections — to grant a United States visa to Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein leader. Mr. Mitchell later wrote that he believed the visa would enable Mr. Adams “to persuade the I.R.A. to declare a cease-fire, and permit Sinn Fein to enter into inclusive political negotiations.” As mediator, Mr. Mitchell insisted that a cease-fire apply to all parties equally, not just to the I.R.A.

Both the Irish and Middle Eastern conflicts figure prominently in American domestic politics — yet both have played out in very different ways. The United States allowed the Irish-American lobby to help steer policy toward the weaker side: the Irish government in Dublin and Sinn Fein and other nationalist parties in the north. At times, the United States put intense pressure on the British government, leveling the field so that negotiations could result in an agreement with broad support. By contrast, the American government let the Israel lobby shift the balance of United States support toward the stronger of the two parties: Israel.

This disparity has not gone unnoticed by those with firsthand knowledge of the Irish talks.In a 2009 letter to The Times of London, several British and Irish negotiators, including John Hume, who shared the Nobel Peace Prize for the Belfast Agreement, criticized the one-sided demands imposed solely on Hamas. “Engaging Hamas,” the negotiators wrote, “does not amount to condoning terrorism or attacks on civilians. In fact, it is a precondition for security and for brokering a workable agreement.”

The resumption of peace talks without any Israeli commitment to freeze settlements is another significant victory for the Israel lobby and the Israeli government. It allows Israel to pose as a willing peacemaker while carrying on with business as usual.

As for Mr. Mitchell, since he was appointed Middle East envoy, he has so far enjoyed almost 600 days of failure. As long as the United States maintains the same hopeless approach, he can expect many more.

Ali Abunimah is the author of “One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse.”

By Daniel Byman

August 25, 2010

New York Times

The biggest obstacle to peace between Israelis and Palestinians is the emergence of Hamas as the de facto government of the Gaza Strip, where 1.5 million Palestinians reside. Peace talks can begin with Hamas on the sidelines, but they cannot finish if Hamas refuses to play ball.

Hamas has proved that it has the means to disrupt peace talks with rocket and mortar strikes, shootings of Israeli soldiers and agricultural workers near the Gaza border, and the kidnapping of personnel from the Israel Defense Forces. But it can also undermine peace talks without using violence.

Hamas can allow other terrorist groups to operate from Gaza and claim impotence or ignorance. It can also stymie talks politically. Hamas regularly argues that the Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas, whose power base is in the West Bank, is selling out the Palestinian cause. This makes it harder for Abbas to entertain concessions to Israel, particularly if they involve no immediate quid pro quo from Israel.

In the meantime, Israel, Egypt and the international community have put Gaza under siege to isolate and weaken Hamas, ideally leading to its overthrow or collapse. Israel, however, has tried to coerce Hamas without causing mass starvation — a difficult balance. Although Israeli policies keep Gaza near the brink, Hamas knows Israel will not let the Strip go over the cliff.

This is small comfort to Gazans. Aid agencies now put Gaza’s poverty rate at 80 percent, and the world lays the blame for this suffering at Israel’s feet. Hamas, despite its aggressive and repressive agenda, is successfully portraying itself as a victim of Israeli cruelty and violence.

The siege of Gaza has failed on another level: It has not crippled Hamas. Today, Hamas has a monopoly on the use of force in the Gaza Strip, and its political clout among Palestinians has grown at the expense of moderates such as Abbas. The siege has increased the importance of the social services that it provides and it also taxes the goods smuggled through tunnels between Gaza and Egypt. Hamas has found it easier to raise money from Iran, which is eager to attach its name to such a high-profile and popular anti-Israel group.

Some Israelis believe that the alternative to the siege is to confront Hamas head-on, removing it from power by reoccupying Gaza and forcing it underground. But that strategy would lead Israel into a quagmire. And occupying Gaza again would hurt Israel’s relations with the United States, the international community and the moderate Palestinian leadership of the West Bank.

If Hamas cannot be uprooted, it might be convinced to not disrupt peace talks with violence and tone down its rhetoric. In order for Hamas to want a lasting cease-fire, Israel and its allies must change the organization’s decision-making calculus — a process that will require both incentives and threats.

One way to go about this would be for Israel to allow the regular flow of goods into Gaza with international, rather than Israeli, monitors manning the crossing points. Israeli intelligence would still watch what goes in and out to ensure that the monitors did their job, but symbolically the switch would be important.

In exchange, Hamas would commit to a lasting cease-fire and agree to stop all attacks from the territory under its control. Hamas would also close the tunnels and end its smuggling.

Such a deal would allow Hamas to claim credit for improving the lives of Gazans, and it could use the resulting increase in the flow of goods to reward its supporters. For Israel, the regular rocket attacks would come to a complete halt and the threat of renewed attacks would diminish. A cease-fire would also free up Israel diplomatically. If the problem of Hamas receded, Israel could take more risks at the negotiating table with Abbas.

Palestinian moderates would rightly complain that Israel was rewarding violence. And if Gaza’s economy improved, the contrast between living conditions there and living conditions in the West Bank would become less stark, which would hurt Abbas politically. In order to offset any political gains Hamas might make, the international community should encourage efforts to provide law and order, reduce corruption, and otherwise build a state in the West Bank. This would help make Abbas’ government a true rival to Hamas when it came to governance.

Formalizing the cease-fire with Hamas would raise the question of whether Israel and moderate Palestinians were simply postponing an inevitable fight and allowing the enemy to get stronger. However, if the rocket attacks from Gaza resumed or if credible evidence emerged that Hamas was dramatically increasing its military capabilities, Israel would have a strong case for resuming the siege in a more comprehensive way or using force. The international community, therefore, must support not only the idea of formalizing the cease-fire but also Israel’s right to retaliate militarily if, despite Israel’s concessions, Hamas returned to violence.

Daniel Byman is a professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and a senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. A longer version of this article will appear in the September/October issue of Foreign Affairs.