By Geoffrey Aronson

Foundation for Middle East Peace

Settlement Report | Vol. 20 No. 5 | September-October 2010

President Barack Obama’s extraordinary diplomatic effort over the last two years has failed to contain to any significant and lasting degree the expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem. Already in its first days, the Obama administration placed a settlement freeze, then defined by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as “not some settlements, not outposts, not natural growth exceptions”–at the center of its diplomatic effort and made it the litmus test of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s commitment to a two state solution. Washington’s subsequent failure to establish meaningful constraints on settlement expansion was highlighted by the September 27, 2010 end of Israel’s ten month inconclusive settlement moratorium and the official resumption of new construction. The settlement issue nonetheless continues to define the flagging U.S. effort, even though American officials have concluded that the focus on settlements was obstructing rather than facilitating its broader diplomatic agenda.
The Obama administration is now attempting to win from Israel a two month re-imposition of the moratorium in order to convince PLO chairman Mahmoud Abbas to resume direct talks, which stalled when the moratorium lapsed. In the days since the September 26 expiration of the moratorium, work has reportedly begun on close to 500 new settlement dwellings, increasing the number of units currently under construction in the West Bank to approximately 2,000. In view of this new construction, the practical value of a reimposition of a settlement moratorium becomes increasingly marginal.

To the extent that there is a substantive U.S. diplomatic agenda, it is that two months of direct talks are all that is required to reach an agreement on where to place the border between Israel and a nascent Palestinian state. In view of the fact that diplomats have failed to draw an agreed border between Israel and Palestine for more than more than seven decades, and the chasm currently separating the positions of Netanyahu and Abbas, Washington’s compressed timeline appears to be little more than a leap of faith.

The Obama administration’s actions can be roughly divided into five phases.
Phase I – Settlement Freeze

Before assuming office in January 2009, top administration officials had decided to place a settlement freeze at the center of “confidence building” measures that would enable progress toward an end to Israel’s occupation and the creation of an independent Palestinian state at peace with Israel. President Obama seized the policy initiative, declaring in Cairo in June 2009 “the illegitimacy of continued Israeli settlements,” and describing the solution of the conflict as a “vital national security interest” of the United States.

Obama’s insistent call for a comprehensive end to continued settlement activity was unprecedented in its intensity. In July 2009, however, the limits of Obama’s commitment to the freeze were revealed when Washington bowed before Israel’s continuing settlement expansion in East Jerusalem, notably at the site of the Shepherds Hotel in Sheikh Jarrah, throwing its demand for a freeze into disarray and underlining the continuing stalemate. From this point onward, Washington has sought, with little consistency or success, to “freeze” the freeze debate and focus its effort upon the achievement of a largely procedural objective–the establishment of direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)–in order to address the core issues in dispute.

Phase II – Stillborn Direct Talks

A September 2009 meeting between Netanyahu, Abbas, and Obama was expected to mark the inauguration of a new phase in Washington’s Middle East policy. The summit was intended, as the president himself acknowledged, “to move off the rut that we’re in currently.” The leaders met but the overall effort to initiate direct negotiations was stillborn.

Phase III – Settlement Moratorium

In October 2009, Abbas decried his “betrayal” by Washington because of Obama’s failure to win a complete freeze and declared his intention not to run for reelection as chairman of the Palestinian Authority, then scheduled for 2010. On November 25, 2009 Netanyahu announced a 10-month partial moratorium on settlement construction in the West Bank, noting that, “When the suspension ends my government will revert to the policies of previous governments in relation to construction.”

In a choreographed response, Secretary of State Clinton issued the following statement:

We believe that through good-faith negotiations the parties can mutually agree on an outcome which ends the conflict and reconciles the Palestinian goal of an independent and viable state based on the 1967 lines, with agreed swaps, and the Israeli goal of a Jewish state with secure and recognized borders that reflect subsequent developments and meet Israeli security requirements.

The statement reflected Washington’s view of a broader diplomatic effort than a limited moratorium–one that focused on final status arrangements. The Clinton statement offered the U.S. view of the core requirements of each party as the first year anniversary of Obama’s administration neared.

Regarding settlements, the new U.S. language recalled assurances regarding settlement blocs referenced obliquely in the April 2004 letter from President George W. Bush to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon–assurances that the Obama administration has refused to reaffirm.

The Bush letter stated, “In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.” Clinton noted support for “reconcile[ing] the Palestinian goal of an independent state based on the 1967 lines, with agreed [land] swaps, and the Israeli goal of a Jewish state with secure and recognized borders that reflect subsequent developments and meet Israeli security needs.” (emphasis added)

Phase IV – Proximity Talks

Unable to establish a direct dialogue, special U.S. envoy George Mitchell in early 2010 re-branded his shuttle diplomacy as “proximity” talks. This description was a rhetorical device that did little to mask the absence of progress. The inauguration of this new phase heralded neither a new diplomatic framework nor the establishment of a sound foundation for direct diplomatic engagement. Mitchell’s continuing effort did, however, represent Abbas’ willingness, with critical support by the Arab League, to engage diplomatically despite the unmet demand for a credible settlement freeze.

Phase V – Direct Talks

The focus of U.S. diplomacy in the months before the September 26, 2010 expiration of the 10 month moratorium more than ever centered upon the procedural objective of starting direct negotiations. Throughout the summer the Obama administration placed a “full court press” on a reluctant Abbas to consent to direct talks “without conditions.”

In June 2010, U.S. officials declared the proximity talks a success, noting that the freeze had “facilitate[d] productive proximity talks to lead into those direct talks and to help facilitate an atmosphere of confidence and trust to address what are, of course, some very complicated issues.” Relations with Netanyahu, which had been strained by the announcement of new settlement plans in East Jerusalem on the eve of Vice President Joseph Biden’s March visit to Israel, also improved after a summit meeting with Obama. With consensus between the parties still absent, the Obama administration contented itself with expressions of hope for the coming phase. The arduously crafted diplomatic formulation of November 2009 was absent.

In September 2010, Israeli and Palestinian leaders and officials met in Sharm el Sheikh and Jerusalem. These encounters marked a Palestinian retreat from their unequivocal opposition to direct talks in the absence of a comprehensive settlement freeze. Two rounds of talks between Netanya−hu and Abbas offered a forum for an introductory exchange of views, including on final status issues, but little more. There was no agreement on the agenda for discussions and no clarity on their objective. U.S. officials suggested that an intensive effort over three months to determine the border between Israel and a Palestinian state would signal the transition to final status talks and at the same time solve the issue of the soon-to-expire settlement freeze.

Phase VI – The Moratorium Expires

On September 26, Israel’s 10-month policy of limiting settlement expansion in the West Bank ended. The Netanyahu government intends to continue settlement expansion according to broad guidelines followed by its predecessors. During the moratorium, starts of new settlement units did indeed plummet, but the partial nature of the construction restrictions limited its long-term impact. The expiration of the moratorium highlighted not only the policy’s modest practical impact but also the Palestinians’ inability to move the diplomatic agenda in the direction of the permanent, comprehensive freeze they have demanded at various times over the last 20 years.

Azzam al Ahmad, a key Abbas confidant, alluded to this on September 29 when he noted,

“There will be no negotiations in light of the settlements. The decision is very clear. . . We will not attend any negotiations session before the comprehensive discontinuation of the settlement activities. This is the first time since the Oslo agreement that these activities are opposed with such power. I am saying this for the first time: there is an American and European opposition to the settlement activities, recognizing that these settlements have swallowed our land before our eyes.

Abbas, with Arab League support, made good on an oft-repeated threat to “freeze” the fledgling, bilateral diplomatic track that Washington had labored to engineer. Intensive negotiations by Washington with both parties now focused on “reviving” the stillborn direct talks.
Washington’s current effort appears to be a variation of the unsuccessful undertaking of a year ago when the administration attempted to establish direct talks by providing assurances to each party. The unilateral guarantees that the Obama administration is now proposing to Israel represent U.S. support for Israeli-defined security requirements in the event of a final status agreement. In this critical respect they represent an extraordinary “down payment” that Washington is prepared to make in order to achieve a temporary slow down in new settlement construction. Like the letter sent by President George W. Bush to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2004, the package of security incentives, reportedly including support for a long-term Israeli security presence in the Jordan Valley along Palestine’s eastern frontier, also signals Washington’s wholesale adoption of Israel’s security narrative in the context of an ever-elusive final status agreement. In return for this support Washington is asking the Netanyahu government only for a limited tactical concession. That is, in return for wide-raging American territorial and security assurances that have a direct bearing on the shape of a final status agreement, the Obama administration expects a limited and undefined re-imposition of a settlement construction moratorium whose value diminishes with each passing day.

There are also important differences between the Bush and Obama efforts.

–    The Bush “reassurances” were made before the Annapolis process initiated a policy review by U.S. officials lead initially by now NSC director James Jones to examine Israeli and Palestinian security needs in the event of a final status agreement. This process was transformed into a bilateral U.S.- Israel security dialogue that has proceeded in a track parallel to the better known diplomatic effort. There is no similar U.S.-Palestinian dialogue. The Obama security package offers evidence that these once-separate tracks–one diplomatic and the other security-related–have now been combined.

–    Bush was prepared to compensate Israel for a strategic policy choice–“disengagement” from the Gaza Strip–that Sharon had already made. Obama is trying to “buy” an Israeli decision on a time-limited, partial settlement moratorium that Netanyahu is opposed to making.

–    The Bush letter was conceptually similar to the policy adopted by Sharon. Both were focused on defining the strategic relationship between Israel and the Palestinians. In contrast, Obama appears to be ready to provide specific U.S. guarantees of a strategic nature in return for a temporary, tactical concession.

Obama now supports a two month settlement expansion moratorium, after which Washington promises to “take settlements off the table” until the issue is resolved as part of final status talks. One participant in a recent administration Capitol Hill briefing described this offer as “huge.” This formulation presents an American policy on settlements at odds with the recommendations made in 2001 by the Mitchell Committee report and reaffirmed in the Road Map (2003), notably the demand for an immediate, comprehensive end to settlement expansion, including “natural growth.” While the Bush letter acknowledged that settlements had indeed created facts on the ground that could not be ignored, he did qualify it by noting the need for Palestinian agreement. Obama’s offer to end the U.S. campaign for restrictions on settlement expansion in 60 days if Netanyahu agrees, contains no such caveat.

Washington appears to premise its unusual offer on the assumption that if Israel is reassured that its security concerns will be met, an agreement on borders can be achieved in this short period, removing the issue of a settlement freeze from the diplomatic agenda and making moot the U.S. promise not to oppose continuing settlement after a newly reimposed moratorium expires. Abbas supports a “borders first” effort, as the PLO has for the last two decades. Notwithstanding the U.S. offer, Netanyahu opposes an effort to draw a border, certainly according to the timeline proposed by Washington.

Netanyahu, unlike Sharon, who welcomed the arduously negotiated Bush letter, has rejected the unprecedented Obama demarche as insufficient. He is said to be demanding a re-affirmation of the Bush commitment on settlement annexation. He has also linked his support for a two month moratorium, which under current circumstances is of little practical value, to what has until now been a “final status” demand that Palestinians support Israel’s definition as a Jewish state, throwing an already battered U.S. effort into turmoil.