By James Dobbins

May 1, 2010

The Middle East has seen numerous peacekeeping operations over the past fifty years. Several continue to this day. For over three decades, a U.S.-led force in the Sinai has helped separate Israeli and Egyptian forces and maintain peace between these two states. On Israel’s northern border, a UN force in Lebanon seeks to prevent renewed fighting between Hezbollah militants and Israel. Helpful as these missions have been, they have done nothing to advance resolution of the core dispute between Israel and its Arab neighbors. They have not resolved the fate of the Palestinian population displaced when Israel was created in 1948 or determined the final status of the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel in 1967 but never incorporated into it.

Something more than inter-positional peacekeeping will be needed as part of any accord designed to resolve these core issues. Simply separating the Israeli and Palestinian populations will not be enough, because it is difficult to imagine a Palestinian state that could, immediately upon the signature of a peace agreement, proceed to effectively control its side of the divide and reliably guarantee faithful execution of that accord. The absence of such a state presents a classic chicken versus egg dilemma. There can be no Middle East peace without a Palestinian party capable of effectively controlling the territory under its control, yet no such Palestinian party can be created without a peace agreement. Experience has shown the challenges of establishing these two conditions sequentially. Israel will not end the occupation until it has a reliable negotiating partner, one capable of fulfilling whatever obligations it accepts, but such a Palestinian partner cannot be created under Israeli occupation. These two prerequisites for peace must be put in place more or less concurrently. Doing so will probably require some third party to help the emerging Palestinian state establish itself and at the same time assure Israelis that the peace accord will be faithfully implemented.

Though the nature of a hypothetical peacekeeping force in a new Palestinian state is fraught with uncertainty, it is possible to make well informed predictions about what circumstances would be likely to result in its creation. It seems unlikely that the United States or the rest of the international community would be willing to deploy troops into the Palestinian territories in order to garrison an Israeli occupation or to substitute for it. So a precondition for the deployment of such a force would be an end to that occupation. On the other hand, Israel appears unlikely to agree to a full transfer of sovereignty to a Palestinian state – particularly for functions potentially affecting the safety of the Israeli population, such as security and border control. Thus, an international mission designed to help keep an Israeli-Palestinian peace would need to combine both inter-positional and state-building functions. Certainly one of its responsibilities would be to help prevent incursions and other attacks by Palestinian extremists into Israel, thereby also forestalling Israeli military incursions into the Palestinian state. But the mission would also have to help that state develop the capacity to secure and effectively govern its own territory.

Many non-military elements of an international state-building mission are already in place. U.S., European and UN personnel have been working for some time to improve the quality of Palestinian governance. But these efforts are taking place in the midst of an ongoing military occupation run by an Israeli government that is unsure about whether it truly wants the emergence of a competent Palestinian state – particularly one capable of securing its own territory and population. The international community’s state-building programs are also being conducted in the midst of an ongoing conflict among the Palestinians themselves regarding the nature of their state and control over its institutions. External efforts to build more effective Palestinian institutions are unlikely to make adequate progress until both these impediments – Israeli ambivalence and Palestinian infighting – are removed or at least mitigated in a manner conducive to success.

Palestinian authorities will not want to trade an Israeli occupation for an international one, so international authority would need to be carefully delineated and substantially less sweeping than the current Israeli writ. External assistance in the field of state-building, on the other hand, is likely to be considerably more extensive than what is currently provided – both because the conditions will be more favorable and because with their troops on the ground and at risk, contributing nations will have a strong incentive to improve Palestinian institutional capacity to serve the Palestinian population and control its own territory.

Considerable buy-in would be necessary from both the Israeli and Palestinian sides before the United States or any other government would likely be willing to support such a mission. There is no strong constituency in the United States for coercing Israel to make peace. Nor is there likely to be any stomach among potential troop-contributing nations to force the Palestinians to do so. Thus, if such a mission is to take place, it is more likely to resemble recent UN-led post-conflict missions, which have had the assent of both sides, than the more robust NATO-led peace enforcement efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo – not to speak of the even more intense counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The UN is not a plausible candidate to lead this particular mission, however. Most UN members regard the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza to be, at best, unduly prolonged, and, at worst, illegitimate. Israel, by the same token, does not regard the United Nations as sufficiently impartial to undertake a mission so central to Israeli security. To garner the support of both of the key parties, therefore, it is more likely that the military component of any such international mission would need to be organized as a U.S.-led “coalition of the willing” or, perhaps more likely, by the NATO Alliance.

A plausible construct would thus be a NATO-led military component with a civilian-led parallel organization to handle political, governance and development matters. Both components would require the explicit consent of all the parties to the conflict, and their mandates would likely be embedded in the peace settlement. The governments involved would also likely seek and receive a parallel UN Security Council mandate. The international civilian leader would be appointed by a select group of interested countries, to include those contributing significantly to the NATO-led military force as well as those prepared to provide substantial economic assistance. These governments would also need to provide funding to allow the civilian leader to assemble a staff and to conduct a variety of advisory and assistance activities. This civilian leader would probably need some extraordinary powers deriving from the peace agreement and the accompanying Security Council resolution. Enforcement would largely depend upon voluntary compliance but would have to be backed by a willingness to employ NATO military force, or alternatively the threat to withdraw that force and risk an Israeli reoccupation.

Any peace settlement would fall apart if Israel were to be exposed to continued attacks from Palestinian territory, and these will occur unless the overwhelming majority of Palestinians support the settlement. Achieving peace among Palestinians will thus be essential to sustaining peace between Arabs and Israelis. Certainly there will be few international volunteers to man a peacekeeping mission in a Palestinian state at war with itself. Thus such a deployment will probably require agreement, not just between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, but also between the two major contenders for power in the new Palestinian state, Fatah and Hamas.

Summary

In sum, a peacekeeping force in Palestine is no substitute for agreement among the main Palestinian factions, and between them and Israel, but is a likely and perhaps essential component of such an accord. Although the United Nations is unlikely to be chosen to lead such a force, its experience in overseeing the implementation of a dozen or more similar such peace agreements over the past couple of decades, as well as NATO’s endeavors in Bosnia and Kosovo suggest that this is a feasible, if by no means a certain or easy endeavor.

* James Dobbins, a former Assistant Secretary of State, served throughout the 1990s as the Clinton administration’s Special Envoy for Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, and then as the Bush administration’s first Special Envoy for Afghanistan following 9/11. Since joining the RAND Corporation, where he heads the International Security and Defense Policy Center, he has produced a series of studies looking at the American, UN and European record of nation-building over the past sixty years.

The views expressed in US/MEPolicy Briefs are not necessarily shared by the U.S./Middle East Project.

December 11, 2007

In the lead-up to the Annapolis conference, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has been carefully studying past American attempts at Arab‐Israeli peacemaking. Has she drawn the right lessons from the U.S. diplomatic experience?

Given that the United States has been deeply engaged in the Middle East peace process for more than three decades, experiencing both historic achievements and spectacular failures, there is little need to reinvent the wheel. A group of former officials and scholars has just completed a year‐long series of intensive consultations with dozens of American, Israeli and Arab statesmen and political figures. Following are some of the lessons and recommendations that were identified:

First, U.S. involvement in the peace process must be defined – and seen, both at home, and abroad‐‐as a top White House priority. If the parties sense anything less, they will either ignore or try to subvert American involvement. President Bushʹs speech at Annapolis went a long way toward dispelling the notion that Washington has its mind elsewhere. But there was too much silence between the July announcement and Bushʹs speech in late November, leading some to doubt the intensity of presidential commitment. President Bush will not (and

should not) allow himself to be drawn into the day‐to‐day negotiations, as his predecessor was. But without periodic, unambiguous signals of presidential commitment, the current U.S. initiative risks faltering.

Second, the U.S. must ensure that Palestinians and Israelis move beyond an incremental approach and focus on ending their conflict. In theory, Annapolis ‐‐ with its emphasis on launching final status negotiations – reflects an understanding of this necessity. In practice, however, the Administration continues to resist the notion of U.S. engagement on the most sensitive core issues, preferring a hands‐off approach. Such a conclusion draws the wrong lessons from the past. Over the years, Washington’s most important achievements have come when it was prepared to take risks and delve into the substantive issues that divided Arabs and Israelis. Annapolis demonstrated that, left to their own devices, the parties cannot take the final step and agree to bold compromises. Indeed, they were unable to agree on the general outlines of a negotiated settlement; their joint ʺunderstandingʺ failed even to list the core issues. Past successes, together with Annapolis’s failure in this regard, underscore the necessity for the U.S., at some future point, to put forward bridging proposals.

Third, the U.S. needs to involve key international and regional actors. Arab states were invited to Annapolis, an indication that the Bush Administration understands there is an opportunity to build a regional structure of support for peace with Israel. This is essential for two reasons: regional support provides political cover to Palestinian leaders while simultaneously offering Israel the prospect of broader normalization – a goal Israeli and Jewish leaders have long sought. For Arab support to be sustained and deepened, however, meaningful progress will have to be made both at the negotiating table and on the ground.

A key question revolves around Syria. Having succeeded in bringing Damascus to Annapolis, the Bush Administration should now test Syria’s and Israel’s interest in renewed negotiations. The more Syria develops a stake in this new diplomatic process, the less it will have an incentive to undermine it. Expanding dialogue with Damascus beyond the issue of Iraq remains a highly controversial matter within the Administration, as some officials fear such engagement will come at the expense of Lebanon’s sovereignty. But that is not inevitable. It should be possible for the U.S. and its European allies to engage Syria, support the Lebanese government, maintain stability along the Lebanese‐Israeli border and stand behind the UN tribunal.

Fourth, the U.S. should closely monitor developments on the ground. If there is one lesson that ought to be learned from the past, it is that even the most vaunted diplomatic process cannot long survive without genuine improvements in Palestinian and Israeli lives. This in turn requires a far more serious effort by Washington to monitor and assess each side’s compliance with its commitments. Former policy makers unanimously recognized that U.S. failure to establish strict accountability by the two parties had been corrosive, eroding mutual confidence, undermining U.S. standing and allowing destructive developments to proceed unchecked.

When the Road Map was first introduced in 2003, Washington committed itself to monitoring implementation,

going so far as to dispatch an envoy. But the mission quickly was aborted. The Annapolis statement suggests the Administration may have drawn the right lessons in this regard, insofar as it calls on the U.S. to judge the parties’ implementation of their Road Map obligations. The Administration now needs to demonstrate its commitment and willingness to assess impartially Palestinian and Israeli performance.

Fifth, the U.S. must stand fast, even in the face of political obstacles. At various times, rejectonists in Israel or among the Palestinians will seek to derail this new initiative. As this occurs, Washington must stay the course. To be sure, the Administration will have to keep a close eye on local developments in both entities. But, equally crucially, no actor should be allowed a veto over the process. From the early 1990s onwards, U.S. diplomacy has tended to pay too much attention to Israeli domestic developments, while paying too little to Palestinian domestic developments. This time, the Administration should seek a better balance, understanding political realities and constraints, but not being paralyzed by them.

Annapolis offers an important opportunity to turn the page, generating momentum on the ground, at the negotiating table and in the region. Drawing the right lessons from past negotiations will be critical to transforming this opportunity into reality.

Together with Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer, Scott Lasensky is co-author of “Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace,” which will be published this winter by the United States Institute of Peace Press. Lasensky is a Senior Researcher at the United States Institute of Peace, and Acting Vice President of the Institute’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. He served as Assistant Director of the U.S./Middle East Project from 2000-2003. These views are his own.

November 10, 2007

The litany of bad news from the Middle East seems to grow by the week. In Iraq, the U.S. is failing to turn the tide, Turkey prepares to move against the PKK in the north while the Kurdish, Shiite and Sunni communities are on a collision course concerning control over Kirkuk. Millions of Iraqis have fled their country as refugees, adding an element of instability that will last for years. The debate about a U.S. strike against Iran is well underway in Washington and Israel has already conducted air‐strikes against Syria. Palestinian militants and the IDF have not stopped fighting, Gaza is suffering the twin evils of the siege and poor governance, and a major Israeli incursion may be just around the corner. Fault lines cut across Lebanon atop of which sit an EU‐UN peacekeeping force. In short, the human suffering in the region is extensive and worsening. These violent conflicts are drawing ever closer to each other and to Europe.

Yet, apparently, European leaders still do not feel the motivation to act.

When our two organizations held a roundtable discussion with over 25 Middle East experts from across Europe last month, we discovered real dismay over Europe’s policy drift. European engagement with Iran seems to have been pursued for its own sake, rather than with a clear strategy in mind. Taxpayers in the EU and associated countries (like Norway and Switzerland) were the largest donors in a $10‐billion peace‐building effort in Palestine which, it now seems clear, will not have a sustained impact without an end to the occupation. The Barcelona process on Mediterranean integration presumed a correlation between democracy and trade‐led growth, yet the region is on a path of increased growth, failing democracy and no dialogue with Europe on critical security issues such as nuclear proliferation. Meanwhile, the EU apparently believes it has virtually no influence over Turkey in its conflict with the Kurds, while the Quartet’s principles have prevented Europe from engaging with Hamas in support of peace‐making efforts made by Saudi Arabia and others.

In short, at a time when the region is in desperate need of constructive diplomatic action, Europe seems satisfied with following the U.S. lead. The transatlantic relationship has trumped the relationship between Europe and its neighbors, leading to a paralysis in European policy.

The absence of robust and independent European diplomacy is a bad thing. Here’s why:

Rising instability: Both sides of the Atlantic have witnessed a sharp and rapid decline in their ability to influence global events. This results from the reemergence of China, India and Russia in an increasingly multi‐polar world. In the Middle East, the U.S. – long the dominant regional power – has been severely weakened by its Iraq adventure. Regional powers – notably Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Syria – are all seeking to fill that vacuum in line with their narrow interests. Virtually no one in the region believes the U.S.‐led conference in Annapolis will stabilize an increasingly shaky regional system. Indeed, many at the roundtable feared that the Israel‐Palestinian conflict once again would turn into an “existential conflict” ‐‐ not unlike the period preceding the 1967 war, only this time in a far more fragmented and violent context. Meaningful European engagement in this period of dangerous transition is badly needed.

Responding to transnational violence: Current U.S. and European policies are not suited to deal with one of the more potent manifestations of this instability, the rise of transnational violence. The single‐minded emphasis on security in European domestic and foreign policies has proceeded on the assumption that there is no connection between violence and political grievances. This has led to further polarization, feeding regional conflicts rather than mitigating them. It has meant taking sides in Iraq, between Israel and Palestine, among Palestinians and among Lebanese; it also has meant lining up against Syria and Iran. Adopting one or two of those postures might be sustainable at any one time; taking all of them at once is not. Worse, it validates the view of many that the U.S. and Europe are determined to subjugate the region and is used as justification for resort to politically‐motivated violence. For Europe to focus on security alone – both at home and abroad – to the exclusion of a coherent diplomatic strategy aimed at addressing grievances contributes to the dynamics which perpetuate transnational violence.

Protecting European interests: To a large extent, the U.S. is ignoring European interests on key regional issues. On Iraq, Iran and Israel‐Palestine, the key debates are occurring in Washington; European leaders are being asked – and typically agree – simply to follow. In Lebanon as with Syria, European diplomacy is severely constrained by hawkish U.S. policies despite the fact that European (not American) soldiers are deployed in Lebanon. As a result, Europe is forsaking its traditional role as an actor with its own diplomacy and intent on defending certain moral values; worse, it is forsaking its basic obligation to protect its interests.

Participants in the Madrid roundtable voiced considerable skepticism concerning the possibility of an independent European regional diplomacy, in part because there is as yet little domestic pressure for such a role. Yet they also emphasized that a more active and constructive approach was a vital European interest given the interconnection between foreign policy (energy, trade, the Middle East peace process) and domestic issues (such as migration and the ripple effects of Mideast conflicts on Muslim communities across the continent). In the absence of an independent voice and policy, Europe increasingly is exposed to violence by those seeking to express opposition to the U.S.

Although Europe consistently asserts the need for diplomatic solutions, it lacks a coherent diplomatic strategy of its own. Some of this stems from institutional obstacles facing the Common Foreign and Security Policy; even so, both EU and associated states should be able to do more and better, whether individually or collectively.

Diplomacy now: Europe has seemed content to allow further regional polarization, awaiting the resumption of diplomacy at an as-of-yet undefined time in the future. But the passage of time is not neutral or harmless. In Israel‐Palestine, it exercises a pernicious influence, both because Israeli policies undermine the likelihood of a viable Palestinian state and because the Palestinian national movement is gradually disintegrating. In Iraq, Turkey’s actions in the north risk dragging Europe into the conflict in new ways. A U.S. confrontation with Iran could have devastating implications for the safety of European troops in Lebanon.

Conflict resolution or use of force? European decision makers need to decide whether to stand aside as the region drifts toward a generalized conflagration, or whether to use the full range of their diplomatic tools to try to stop the slide. Israel’s air‐strikes against Syria were met with a deafening silence, which in the present context amounts to a green light for further attacks. Is this Europe’s policy? If so, does it mean that its diplomacy has moved from a commitment to Israel’s existence and security towards blind acceptance of Israel’s policies? Given the trajectory of U.S and Israeli policy, Europe must decide whether and where to draw the line.

Likewise, Europe must acknowledge that conflict resolution is above all a political enterprise. Economic projects and institution‐building in Palestine, however valuable, are sideshows in regard to the fundamental challenge of finding a political solution to a political conflict.

Inclusion, not exclusion: European policy should be based on an inclusive approach and in particular ought not to support policies based on the exclusion of significant actors. This is the rationale behind Norway’s and Switzerland’s approach to Lebanon and Palestine, where they have sought to promote national reconciliation rather than further divide the polities. In contrast the EU, constrained by ill‐advised Quartet principles, was unable to react constructively to the Mecca Agreement between Fatah and Hamas.

Security dialogue: The region is in desperate need of an inclusive, longer‐term security dialogue, modeled, perhaps, on the CSCE (the precursor to the modern‐day OSCE) and Europe is ideally suited to convene it. A regional security framework is needed to regulate the situation in the Gulf, between Israel and Syria and in order to deal with the risk of nuclear proliferation. This is all the more important because the overall regional environment directly affects the safety of EU peacekeepers in Lebanon and could lead to a larger conflagration.

A norms‐based approach: A traditional source of strength for European diplomacy has been its grounding in international law and norms. From Iraq to Israel, Europe should insist on evenhanded adherence to such principles as the best way to defend human rights and human security. This would require Europe to engage Israel on its settlement policy or its Gaza siege, just as it would require it to engage with Palestinian factions and Hezbollah to get them to end their rocket attacks against Israeli civilians. Moreover, EU trade instruments should be linked explicitly to EU human rights legislation; this could be followed up at the administrative level by denying European companies working in Israeli settlements access to EU procurement contracts.

In the same spirit, European diplomacy should adhere to fair and defensible principles. Together with Arab states, it should argue strongly for a resolution of the Arab‐Israeli conflict on the basis of UN resolution and the Arab Peace Initiative. It should authorize European diplomats to engage with Palestinian armed groups with the aim of managing internal conflict and bringing them into the peace process in ways that will bolster security for Israeli citizens. It should take the position that, in the event of failure on the part of Israelis and Palestinians to reach an agreement, occupation is not a permanent default position: the preambles of both UN Resolutions 242 and 338 affirm the illegitimacy of acquiring territory by force. At the same time, a European approach should recognize that Palestinian statehood coupled with de facto Israeli control (as in the Gaza Strip) is not sustainable.

Participants in the Madrid roundtable were highly skeptical that any of this was politically viable at present. Yet they also recognized that the region needs an independent European voice as never before. This is likely to remain the case for as long as the U.S. pursues policies that polarize the region and fail to create the political space necessary for parties at war – or on the brink of war – to seek common ground through negotiations. Europe cannot become a substitute for the U.S. Still, as a series of interrelated conflicts looms, it is high time for it to play a more active and constructive role lest it find itself a passive witness to, and a principal victim of, dangerous and misguided policies.

* Mariano Aguirre is Director of Peace, Security and Human Rights at the Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior (FRIDE) in Madrid. Mark Taylor is Deputy Managing Director of the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, Oslo. The authors wish to thank participants in the “The Roundtable of European Policy Researchers on the Middle East”, 19 October, 2007 in Madrid. The Roundtable was co-organized by the Spanish think-tank FRIDE and the Fafo Institute from Norway. While we have drawn heavily on the Roundtable discussion, the views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone.

THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THE US/MEPOLICY BRIEFS REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THEIR AUTHORS, NOT NECESSARILY THOSE OF THE U.S./MIDDLE EAST PROJECT.

October 9, 2007

In an article in Salon.com on 19 September, Steven Clemons describes a debate at a recent Washington dinner party attended by eighteen persons at which “Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft squared off across the table over whether President Bush will bomb Iran.”Brzezinski, former national security advisor to President Carter, Clemons writes, said he believed Bush’s team had laid a track leading to a single course of action: a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Scowcroft, who was national security advisor to President Ford and the first President Bush, held out hope that the current President Bush would hold fire, and not make an already disastrous situation for the U.S. in the Middle East even worse.

The 18 people at the party, including former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, then voted with a show of hands for either Brzezinski’s or Scowcroft’s position. Scowcroft got only two votes, including his own. Everyone else at the table shared Brzezinski’s fear that a U.S. strike against Iran is around the corner.

Clemons, who moderated the debate, argues that the case presented in terms of a ‘binary decision’ – to bomb or not to bomb – is unlikely to lead to the decision to bomb Iran, for various reasons, resting mainly on the U.S. military’s known opposition to conflict with Iran. In his final paragraph, Clemons suggests that “we should also worry about the kind of scenario David Wurmser has floated, meaning an engineered provocation. An ‘accidental war’ would escalate quickly and ‘end run,’ as Wurmser put it, the president’s diplomatic, intelligence and military decision‐making apparatus.”

The view from those most likely to be affected by an “accidental” war, Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas, all share the conclusion both that war is imminent and that any one of a number of “ticking clocks” may be “engineered” as a provocation that would by‐pass the Pentagon chiefs of staff arguments against expanded conflict and trigger war. All of these actors have been preparing flat‐out for the coming conflict.

They see the circumstances of the Middle East as one of hair‐trigger instability and escalating tensions. Equally significantly, there is a heightened inter‐linkage between events that suggests that, as in 1912‐14 in Europe, some unexpected and relatively insignificant event – a Sarajevo moment – could ignite currents and dynamics over which major states and movements would have little influence.

Iran (from where I have just returned) as well as leaders such as Hassan Nasrallah and Khaled Mesha’al see the signs of preparations for conflict taking place in Israel. These are the signs they see: Israel conducting low level overflights in Lebanon to create sonic booms; Israel, whose prime minister had been volubly warning of the risks of some misunderstanding leading to war between Israel and Syria, then launching an aerial incursion into Syria. And all of this as the international community remained silent.

The Syrians saw on their radars the four fighters that penetrated into Northern Syria from the Mediterranean; but they also saw the much larger numbers of Israeli aircraft that were flying in a holding position close to Cyprus. The Syrians were not about to disclose their anti‐aircraft missile capacities to Israel; and the intruders dropped the munitions and their long‐range fuel tanks without pressing any attack, but returned to join the larger group still flying a holding pattern off Cyprus before all returned to Israel as a single formation.

The Israeli objective remains a matter of speculation, but the general conclusion is that Israel was only ready to run such a risk against unknown air defenses either as a proving run or, given the size of the numbers of aircraft off Cyprus, to destroy some target that for whatever reason they were unable to engage. Either way, the mission seems related to future conflict.

Observers here note again that others will have seen the attack on their radars (the UK has a Sovereign Base on Cyprus), even though the incursion took place at very low altitude. Yet nothing was said.

This is only one among a series of ticking clocks:

(i) Lebanon: The ticking clock in Lebanon is the need to nominate a new president in a process whose first step began on 23 September, 2007. Without a new president, the president’s authority, by default, falls to the Siniora government – an outcome which both the incumbent president and the opposition have declared to be unacceptable.

Ominously for observers, several among the March 14 forces (pro‐government supporters) seem unperturbed at the impasse, disinterested in finding a solution and unwilling to seek a compromise, leading to speculation that they are expecting broad regional changes that would significantly weaken Hezbollah and Syria.

If the impasse continues, President Lahoud may decide to nominate a parallel prime minister who, in turn, would appoint a parallel government. Two governments, both claiming legitimacy, and a division of Lebanon into spheres of control is a real possibility.

Were two governments to be established in Lebanon, especially at a time when Syria is again at the front of U.S., Israeli and European demonization, what will be the reaction of the U.S.? Will Israel see an opportunity to strike again at Hezbollah, in the context of escalating tensions with Syria? What would be Syria’s reaction to Israeli intervention? What would be the response of Iran? And finally, how will this impinge on the quarter of a million Palestinian refugees in Lebanon who have become increasingly radicalized as a result of Lebanese hostility and discrimination, as well as the continuing events in Nahr El‐Bared Camp in northern Lebanon?

(ii) Syria: Syria is also analyzing events in terms of the possibility of conflict emerging in the coming months with Israel. Although Israel has made peace overtures towards Syria, from the Syrian optic, the litmus test of both Israeli and U.S. intentions towards Syria will be U.S. policy towards Lebanon.

(iii) The Salafis: This is another ticking clock that might literally explode at any moment. The conflict with the Salafi group, Fatah al‐Islam, based in Nahr El‐Bared, north of Tripoli in Lebanon, has ended, but it is clear that there are a number of other salafi groups operating in Lebanon which are drawing on components of Lebanese popular support centered around Tripoli ‐ an overwhelming Sunni area where salafi’ism has become established amongst poorer young Muslims.

Salafi groups are equally strong in Syria and in Jordan. It seems that a number of these salafi groups that are in place are no longer combat units of the type we have seen in Nahr El‐Bared, but are smaller sabotage units of 3‐5 man cells. An unforeseen Saraejvo‐like assassination of a grand duke might unleash currents and dynamics that would be difficult to control at this time in the region.

(iv) Iraq: Iranian officials understand that the message being relayed from U.S. commanders to the administration in Washington is that to the extent they have an ability to tamp down violence, the only justification for the Surge is to provide the space for political reconciliation by Iraqi politicians. The Iranian fear is that the U.S. might toy with engineering a new political leadership in Iraq, and is aware of U.S. talks with Ba’athists and tribal leaders that are taking place in Jordan about the prospect of forming a new administration to replace Maliki’s government. The arming of the tribal leaders in Anbar, who are not the resistance – even if some of their tribal members are participants – is seen by Iran as seeding the ground for a longer‐term civil war. These tribal leaders hate the Shi’i, loathe Iran and detest the Islamists who threaten to undermine the traditional structures of power.

For the Iranians, dispossession of the Shia in Iraq by the U.S. – especially dispossession in favor of the Ba’athists is seen as a red line. To cross it would result in a very different posture by the Shi’a militia and forces in Iraq against U.S. and coalition forces there.

(v) Pakistan: President Musharaf teeters at the edge of loosing control in Pakistan. He is facing widespread popular hostility for his closeness to the U.S., and at the same time the disapprobation of the U.S. for not doing enough in the North West Frontier Province and in Waziristan against insurgents. The U.S. and NATO seem likely to take independent action in the tribal areas. This risks bringing down Musharaf’s administration.

(vi) Turkey: As the Kurdish internal insurgency continues, sentiment in Turkey is pushing for military incursions into northern Iraq. So far, these have been held at bay by U.S. military action against the PKK within Iraq. The PKK, however, are unlikely to be easily defeated in their mountainous terrain by U.S. special forces, and conflict between Turkey and this group seems likely to break out sooner or later.

(vii) Instability in the West Bank: The present situation is probably unsustainable beyond the short term; either we will see a move towards negotiations between Fatah and Hamas, or we will see growing instability in the West Bank. It is wrong to assume that Hamas are powerless in the West Bank. In the last parliamentary elections in January 2006, Hamas won 4 seats to Fatah’s 1 in Ramallah; 4 seats to 2 in Nablus; 9 seats to 0 in Hebron. Aggregating overall West Bank cities, Hamas won 30 seats to Fatah’s 12.

The West Bank clearly is different than Gaza in that Israel is deployed on the ground in the form of checkpoints and military outposts, but Hamas’ ability to raise the pressure in the West Bank should not be underestimated.

The U.S. initiative to hold a conference penciled in for Annapolis in November on the Palestinian‐Israeli conflict is largely discounted in the region. The senior Hamas leadership view this as a maneuver aimed principally at tying moderate Arab states support to Israel as part of the preparations for more aggressive action against Iran and Syria, rather than having a Palestinian state as its central purpose. Hamas has concluded that its central purpose is to provide cover for Arab states to be brought into coalition with Israel without unsettling their domestic populations too greatly. The assumption is that this conference could indicate the possible timing of conflict, which might follow soon after the sealing of a coalition.

Summary

While Washington looks at the Iranian prospects through the prism of a binary – to bomb or to acquiesce – a decision to be made by the president over the remainder of his presidency, the actors in the region see the conflict as imminent, and arriving through the backdoor, either via escalation of Western and Israeli tension with Syria, or from events in Lebanon, or a combination of both. All these key actors are convinced that conflict, should it occur, will convulse the entire region. They see the Wursmer “engineered” war that ultimately will extend to Iran as almost upon them; and they wonder at the silence from Europe and from informed observers in the U.S. Is it, they speculate, that everyone is so focused on Iraq, and so convinced that Iraq will be the arena in which the decision on Iran will be shaped, that they have forgotten to attend to the backdoor through which others already have a foot through?

* Alastair Crooke is Co-Director of Conflicts Forum based in Beirut. Before establishing Conflicts Forum, he was advisor on Middle East issues to Javier Solana, the EU Foreign Policy Chief, a staff member of Senator George Mitchell’s Fact Finding Committee that inquired into the causes of the Intifada (2000-2001), and advisor to the International Quartet.

THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THE US/MEPOLICY BRIEFS REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THEIR AUTHORS, NOT NECESSARILY THOSE OF THE U.S./MIDDLE EAST PROJECT.

September 20, 2007

In Washington, September will be almost entirely devoted to Iraq. A flurry of reports will be issued, most prominently by General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and several Congressional hearings will be held. These are supposed to set the tone for the final chapter of the Bush administration’s efforts in Iraq. Much depends on how the public and Congress assess the U.S. surge – which, in turn, depends on the standard against which it is measured.

Conceived as a last-ditch effort to right what was wrong, the U.S. security plan, known as the surge, so far has consisted primarily of a military effort to suppress some of Iraq’s most violent non-state actors, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Muqtada Al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army (JAM). The idea behind the military effort was to create the political space necessary for the government to forge deals with its Sunni opponents.

The surge has met at best half of its goals. Militarily, there has been progress, particularly against AQI, although it has been mixed, controversial and potentially fleeting. The militias have not been defeated – they melted away or are waiting out the surge.

On the political side, the picture is far clearer, and almost entirely negative, with little to no progress on any of the Bush administration’s own benchmarks. Once the surge comes to an end, little of the underlying structure will have changed.

The Surge

The surge has worked in one quite circumscribed way: where there are more troops, there is less violence. The military campaign has succeeded in calming some areas that in the past proved particularly violent and inaccessible, such as Anbar and a number of Baghdad neighborhoods.

The most remarkable change appears to be the fact that local Sunni leaders (tribal elements and/or former insurgent commanders) have been turning against AQI. This phenomenon needs to be assessed more fully over time, but relative quiet in Anbar does suggest there has been a significant change there. This is largely due to increased friction over AQI’s brutal tactics, proclamation of an Islamic State and escalating assaults on Iraqis labeled traitors or apostates (including policemen, civilians and mere cigarette smokers). Occasionally, quarrels have turned into enduring vendettas, especially when spurred by the assassination of notable tribal or insurgent figures, such as Sattar Abu Risha’s father and brother, or the head of the 1920 Revolution Brigades.

That said, several considerations must temper the claims of success:

• Violence is above all a consequence of Iraq turning into a failed state, the reconstruction of which would require a sustained and protracted effort, inconsistent with the surge’s short timeframe.
• With the notable exception of a tribal “awakening,” the conflict’s overall dynamics remain unchanged: self-sustaining and multi-layered violence, governmental partiality and paralysis, intra-communal fragmentation, further state fracturing (with the electricity grid now being carved up) and steady decrease in the provision of basic services, unrelenting displacements and brain-drain, and insurgent groups implementing a strategy of “recoil, redeploy and spoil,” which represents the perfect counter to the surge.
• Violence remains extremely high as measured in total incidents or Iraqi and U.S. casualties. This has been well documented by others, in particular Anthony Cordesman in “Tenuous Case for Strategic Patience in Iraq,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Trip Report, August 6, 2007.
• Rather than defeating AQI and JAM, the U.S. military effort essentially displaced these actors. Both organizations remain extremely strong and effective, and AQI demonstrated with its devastating attack on two Yazidi villages in Sinjar that it can act at will in many places in a country where U.S. forces are sparsely distributed. JAM’s partial redeployment out of Baghdad has fueled increased tensions in Southern Iraq and has greatly enhanced the Sadrists’ capabilities in Basra.
• The Sunni turn against AQI is not the end of the story. While it is true that some tribal chiefs, left in the cold after Saddam’s fall, have found in the coalition a new patron eager to provide resources, this hardly equates with a genuine, durable trend toward Sunni Arab acceptance of and participation in the political process. Instead, it is a tactical alliance – forged to confront an immediate enemy (AQI) or the central one (Iran). It certainly is not a step toward consolidation of the central government or institutions, and it could very easily amount to little more than U.S. arming of one side in an increasingly fragmented civil war. Moreover, even those Sunni insurgent groups that are alienated from AQI will work with it to defeat others – the Shiite militias in particular, including ISCI, a key U.S. ally.
• Some Sunni insurgent groups see their rapprochement with the U.S. as providing them the “strategic depth” needed in the face of their Iranian enemy, thus further drawing the coalition into what increasingly looks like a regional confrontation.
• Any military success risks being reversed once U.S. forces withdraw, as the greater enemy then – Iran – will require a common Sunni front. In Baghdad, the situation remains precarious, with sectarian reprisal killings conceivably down but with very few internally displaced returning to their original homes. From a mosaic of people, the city has become a mosaic of sectarian enclaves, their myriad boundaries patrolled by U.S. forces accompanied by government forces. The latter are likely to crumble the moment U.S. forces depart.
• In the meanwhile, coalition forces are helping tilt the balance in the capital in favor of Shiite domination by “softening-up” Sunni strongholds such as Dora, which Shiite militia have openly promised to “level” once the surge comes to an end.

Political Reconciliation

So far, there has been virtually no progress on this front. In announcing the security plan in January 2007, President Bush requested the Maliki government to reach a series of political deals with its allies and adversaries that would recalibrate power relations, providing the Sunnis with a sense their future is secure without giving them a realistic hope of returning to power. True to its sectarian nature, the Maliki government has proven reluctant to move forward on these benchmarks and is unlikely to meet any of them. If some progress has been made on aspects of the hydrocarbons legislative package (notably on revenue sharing), it is because the envisioned deal is between the ruling Shiite Islamist parties and the Kurdish parties, not between the coalition of these two and the minority Sunnis. Other deals, all between the ruling Shiite/Kurdish coalition and the Sunnis, concerning de-de-Baathification, constitutional review and provincial elections, appear even further from being realized.

The more fundamental problem has been the failure to build institutions at either the national or local levels that are viewed as legitimate instruments to fairly allocate goods and services. This has been a government that does not deserve any part of its name: it is not unified, does not present the nation, and has failed to govern. This is because the U.S. destroyed what was left of the Iraqi state and because the government is a sectarian side in the civil war.

The recent defections from the government further underline that it represents no one but (some of the) the Green Zone politicians. Attempts to rebuild it have led to a new “moderate” coalition that is even narrower than the previous one: the only Sunni Arab who remains is Tareq al-Hashemi, the vice-president, not even his own party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, let alone the coalition of which the IIP is a part, the Iraqi Consensus Front. The only two things these parties have in common is that they all existed in exile before 2003 (the IIP had members inside Iraq as well but were inactive), and that, whatever their moderation, they are either secessionist (the Kurds, and arguably the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI)) or politically almost irrelevant (Da’wa and the IIP).

As a result, no progress toward building state institutions has been made. The GAO report showed the police force to be a total disaster and said it should be rebuilt from scratch. The judiciary remains a shambles. The link between Baghdad and the governorates is almost non-existent (something that the Kurds applaud and encourage). Many provincial councils do not represent their constituencies due to the flaws and circumstances of the January 2005 elections. There is no reason to believe that in the current environment of intersecting violent conflicts, a successful effort can be made to rebuild broken institutions. At best what can be accomplished is the empowerment of institutions, including the armed forces, that risk breaking apart the moment U.S. forces withdraw and that will join whatever side they represent in the various conflicts.

In the absence of a viable political strategy and, subsequently, real advances on the political front, the surge is likely to amount to little more than a temporary reprieve. It is most likely to leave behind not a stable Iraq – not a centralized, decentralized or even neatly partitioned one — but rather an assortment of fiefdoms in the hands of militias, gangs, and other groups vying for power and resources in an increasing number of civil wars.

Joost Hiltermann is Deputy Director of the Middle East Program at the International Crisis Group.

Peter Harling is the Senior Iraq Analyst at the International Crisis Group and is currently based in Damascus.

Robert Malley is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the U.S./Middle East Project and directs the Middle East Program at the International Crisis Group.

July 20, 2007

On July 16th, President Bush delivered a lengthy pronouncement on an updated Middle East peace policy. Originally, it had been planned to coincide with the fifth anniversary of the president’s June 24th 2002 speech committing the United States to a two-state solution and, perhaps more notably, advocating a Palestinian regime change and imposing a series of preconditions before any political process would be launched. Not surprisingly, those preconditions were never met and five years have passed without a peace process.

The regime change agenda, however, was more successful and in ways that one imagines the Administration had not intended. The Administration probably cannot claim Yasser Arafat’s death as one of its achievements, but what followed in no small measure was the product of a U.S.-driven policy. After Mahmoud Abbas succeeded Arafat as Palestinian Authority president, neither he nor his Fatah party were assisted in producing any political deliverables to the public for which they could claim credit. Parliamentary elections were advanced and Hamas swept a clear majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council.

Given the score card after five years it might have been reasonable to expect a policy re-think. However, reason has continued to be sidelined, and the July 16th speech was more of the same with even less chance of success.

More of the Same

The speech can perhaps best be characterized as pushing down softly on the accelerator of a failed Middle East policy. The president continued to promote deepening divisions among the Palestinians, insist on pre-conditions to a two-state solution and display an unwillingness to outline his own parameters for an Israeli-Palestinian endgame deal (instead, dropping hints regarding the territorial issue, such as “mutually agreed adjustments,” while refusing to explicitly refer to the 1967 lines or offer any guidance on Jerusalem or refugees). Even the $190 million dollars of money pledged to the new PA government was mostly a repackaging of old commitments.

The list of preconditions that even the new U.S.-backed Ramallah government would have to fulfill in order to “have a state of their own” was as familiar as it was unrealistic, including the guaranteed show-stopper “dismantle their (terrorist) infrastructure.”

It is hardly surprising that historian and Shalem Center Fellow (a Jerusalem-based Institute established by Benjamin Netanyahu that is sympathetic to neo-conservative views), Michael Oren, described the speech as follows in a Wall Street Journal op-ed,

Mr. Bush has not backtracked an inch from his revolutionary Middle East policy. Never before has any American President placed the onus of demonstrating a commitment to peace so emphatically on Palestinian shoulders…the bulk of his demands were directed at the Palestinians…Mr. Bush set unprecedented conditions for Arab participation in peace efforts.

The democracy agenda continues to be pursued, albeit less assertively than in 2002. In that speech, democracy was mentioned six times compared to the one reference this time around. The very mention of democracy sounds rather hollow given the policy of boycotting the democratically elected government and the support offered to a new government of dubious legality. As for new Palestinian elections, according to Nathan Brown, an expert on Palestinian reform and Arab constitutionalism at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, this would be “absolutely and positively unconstitutional…The Basic Law was amended in 2005…to fix the term of the PLC at four years. Abu Mazen can issue a decree with the force of law, but he cannot amend the constitution. Only 2/3 of the PLC can do that…There is not the slightest degree of ambiguity.”2

The increasing use being made of the unreformed bureaucratic organs of the PLO and its old guard by the Ramallah Government as a source of legitimacy and legality also hardly accords with the reformist agenda so beloved in Washington.

And it is indeed on the subject of internal Palestinian politics that the current policy is on most shaky ground. If the 2002 speech encouraged a regime change that eventually brought Hamas to power, the new speech may well drive Palestinian politics towards a period of even greater chaos that could create a space for al-Qaeda look-alikes to gain a foothold.

Alistair Crooke, former security adviser to the EU’s Javier Solana, a ceasefire negotiator between Israel and the Palestinians with a wealth of on-the-ground experience, now heading an NGO, Conflicts Forum, describes the situation as follows:

The problem for Hamas is that its constituency – the rank and file – and the wider Islamist movement have now embarked on a period of introspection. What is apparent – and this can be ascertained on any number of Islamist websites – is that the mainstream Islamist strategy of pursuing an electoral path to reform is now being questioned.

The U.S. president continues to mistakenly conflate Hamas with al-Qaeda and the Taliban and, in so doing, almost guarantees the failure of his approach. In Iraq, U.S. policy is belatedly focusing on internal political reconciliation, but in Palestine it is still, sadly, all about deepening divisions.

The two-state solution that the president claims to support will need to deliver basic security and must be seen as legitimate by both Israel and the Palestinians in order to have a chance of being sustainable. That cannot be based on an irreconcilable Palestinian political division. Pursuing a peace effort under these conditions will likely have a de-stabilizing effect and maximize the irredentist push-back in the Palestinian camp against what will anyway be a difficult set of Palestinian deliverables.

What was New and How it Might be Used

The one new announcement in the speech was that a meeting chaired by Secretary Rice would be held in the Fall. Despite White House efforts to lower expectations, the president’s call has been widely touted as the convening of an international peace conference and is being seen as a litmus-test of Administration diplomatic virility. For Secretary Rice this may become one of the last chances to make a diplomatic mark in the region. Her undoubted desire to avoid a huge flop in the Fall is the point of departure for devising a strategy that attempts to constructively leverage the president’s speech.

The U.S. clearly will want key regional and international players at the Conference table, a fact that creates an opening – should they choose to use it — for Arab states and other Quartet partners to negotiate terms of reference. This would be the moment for the Saudis, Egyptians, Jordanians, and the majority of European states who are uncomfortable with current U.S. policy to articulate and bargain over a new approach. It is even conceivable that Secretary Rice herself would welcome a strong stand on the part of her interlocutors in order to steer the president toward a more realistic far-reaching policy.

The model for diplomatic efforts should be the Madrid Conference of 1991. Secretary Rice would have to cast herself in the role of James Baker, this time with the additional challenge of having to convince her boss. At the closing of that Madrid Conference, Secretary Baker said, “The United States is willing to be a catalytic force, and an energizing force, and a driving force in the negotiating process.”4 Secretary Rice would have to adopt that mantle and be all of those things and more. Baker shuttled for eight months around the region putting together the Conference, negotiating the terms of reference for Madrid, which appeared in the letter of invitation and to which all sides agreed. He succeeded in creating a peace process that brought together Israel, the Palestinians, all the neighboring states and an additional ten Arab countries, none of whom had formal relations with Israel. The Fall should not be a hard deadline; the meeting could be postponed if more time for preparatory shuttling is needed.

The substance of the Madrid terms of reference contained four elements that were crucial to its gathering and are relevant for today. First, the effort was comprehensive, involving not only the Palestinians and Jordanians (not yet at peace with Israel), but also the Lebanese and the Syrians. Second, the terms for engagement represented at the time a breakthrough, namely the land-for-peace formula with a comprehensive settlement to be based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. It sounds trite today but was a big deal in the Shamir years. Third, the letter of invitation provided a timetable for an Israeli-Palestinian permanent status agreement. Finally, Madrid brought Israel and the broader Arab world together, holding out the prospect of regional peace and acceptance that is so vital for Israelis. It is often forgotten that Prince Bandar of Saudi Arabia was in attendance at Madrid.

The Conference set in motion five multilateral regional working groups to build confidence between Israel and the Arab world. Politicians and experts met to discuss the environment, economic developments, water, arms-control and regional security and refugees in such places as Muscat, Rabat, Doha, and Tunis. Those groups first convened, in Moscow, less than three months after the Madrid bash.

A similarly ambitious approach calibrated to today’s realty is what Secretary Rice should be encouraged to pursue. Even if her appetite for such a mission is questionable, the president’s speech, perhaps unintentionally, offers an opening. Europe and the Arab states should interpret the call for a Conference as an invitation to start negotiating a contemporary version of the Madrid letter of invitation. Sure, such an approach would contain a hefty dose of chutzpah, and yet it is the best option under today’s circumstances.

The negotiating position of the original Quartet partners, as well as the Arab Quartet, could for instance include:

• Detailed terms of reference for Israeli-Palestinian peace talks;
• Provisions for a comprehensive process that includes Syria;
• A reasonable timetable for progress and completing the talks;
• Modalities for implementing the Arab peace initiative.

Israel would undoubtedly have its own negotiating positions and demands, and rightly so. But that is precisely the point, for we would finally be in a place where the real issues are being discussed, not avoided.
Europe in particular could finally step up its diplomatic game. As a vital player and payer, it should define political conditions for its involvement. Remember, a handful of European states (and even just one would have been sufficient) insisted that the boycott of the PA be maintained by all the EU, so why should a handful of determined EU member states not flip the equation and veto any EU participation in the Conference if certain conditions are not met? Saudi Arabia too, as probably the most sought-after attendee from a U.S. and Israeli perspective, has a rather nifty negotiating hand should it wish to deploy a diplomatic effort. The Bush speech suggested that Arab deliverables to Israel be front-loaded, and even defined four pre-conditions for Arab attendance. Rather than enter a meaningless to and fro regarding, for instance, the level of attendance (leaders, ministers, or local ambassadors) or inducing diplomatic gridlock, certain Arab states could actually engage in an agenda-setting exercise here.

The alternative would be for this Fall’s meeting to resemble the January 2003 conference on Palestinian reform that was convened in London – an eminently forgettable experience.

One remaining question is how the Conference should deal with the elephant in the room – namely Hamas? Here too, the Madrid model may offer guidance. At the time, Israel and the PLO still did not recognize each other and Israel refused to talk to the PLO or to have them officially in attendance. A formula was concocted whereby there would
be a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, the Palestinian members of which could be claimed by Israel to not formally represent the PLO, but who themselves insisted that they were doing everything in coordination with the exiled PLO leadership.

Third parties would have to engage in a side-dialogue with Hamas in advance of the Conference, and essentially address Hamas interests or positions in the envisaged negotiations. Ideally President Abbas would play this role, but he is currently busy climbing higher up the “no return to unity” ladder. Exclusion of Hamas is very unlikely to deliver security, sustainability or legitimacy to any peace process.

Third parties, including Arab states and perhaps Turkey, South Africa or even Europeans, could lead two parallel back-channels. One channel would work towards Palestinian internal reconciliation. The other channel would focus on bringing Hamas into a broader process, including: terms for a mutually binding ceasefire with Israel, normalization of access to and from Gaza and benchmarks toward international engagement. Of course, an inclusive approach regarding Syrian participation would have a facilitating knock-on effect in this regard. At least on the Hamas issue the Israelis may sober up prior to their U.S. friends. All this constitutes an ambitious agenda, but one more realistic and relevant to the region than the current impoverished menu of Middle East meddling on display.

Daniel Levy is a Senior Fellow at The New America Foundation and The Century Foundation. He formerly was as an adviser in Israeli Prime Minister Barak’s office. He was an official negotiator and lead Israeli drafter of the informal Geneva Initiative peace plan.

June 20, 2007

United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, enacted almost forty years ago, has throughout that entire period remained the primary point of reference for Israeli-Palestinian peace making. 242, which received the unanimous support of the Security Council, was deliberately drafted with ambiguities and omissions. Today, it is just these limitations which need to be addressed by the Security Council in a new 242.

The Substance of 242

Following a Preamble which states “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” and the need to work for a “just and lasting peace” that would allow “every State in the area to live in security,” UNSCR 242 articulates two central “principles” on which such a peace should be based:

1. “Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” and
2. “Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats and acts of force.”

Taken together, these two elements constituted an orientation referred to in short-hand as “land for peace.” In addition, the resolution went on to affirm the necessity of guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways (the trigger issue of the 1967 war); a just settlement of the refugee problem; and the use of demilitarized zones to promote territorial inviolability. Finally, the Resolution called on the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to promote the effort to reach an agreement based on the above principles and provisions.

The Limitations and Ambiguities of 242

Many of the silences and ambiguities of 242 were noted at the time. These include:

Land: 242 (in its English version) speaks of withdrawal from “territories occupied” but did not speak of “all of the territory” or mention a return to the 1949 armistice line.

Jerusalem: The holy city is not mentioned at all, and it is unclear to what extent it is to be included in the term “territories.” Further, there is no mention of the holy sites within the city.
Refugees: The resolution speaks of a just settlement of the refugee problem, but is silent on content.

Palestinian State: The Resolution does not even mention the Palestinians, no less a Palestinian State, its borders and sovereign prerogatives.

Settlements: The resolution only speaks about the withdrawal of Israeli “armed forces,” not anticipating the creation of Israeli settlements.

The Current Need

In 1967, “land for peace” was far from uncontroversial. In Israel, acceptance of this framework was the central criterion for distinguishing left from right. And even after peace with Egypt was achieved, rejection of land for peace in the West Bank remained the essence of what was meant by “right-wing.” The PLO did not accept Resolution 242 until 1988; and despite lip service, 242 was rejected by many Arab nations.

Today, 242 does not offer Israel and the PLO sufficient guidance community on how concretely to resolve the remaining final status disagreements. This is unfortunate. On both the Israeli and the Palestinian sides we have weak leaders, and there is considerable doubt as to whether they have the strength to make the hard compromises that will be needed to reach a comprehensive agreement. As an outside force embodying the highest level of international legitimacy, the Security Council can lift some of the burden of compromising-for-peace off the shoulders of the parties. The need right now is for the Security Council to simply speak hard truths to both Israelis and the Palestinians – articulating clearly and forcefully the nature of the compromises that the international community expects of them.

Strong outside pressure is also needed to relieve both polities of the years of recriminations that will undoubtedly follow core compromises, in particular on the issues of refugees and Jerusalem. Such attacks can be anticipated as part of a process of de-legitimization, and to the extent that the Security Council can absorb such
animus, it will contribute to the staying power of any accord.

The Message of a New 242

To the Palestinians:

• Israel was created as a Jewish State under international law, and will remain one if it so chooses.
• There will be substantial compensation for refugees, but no significant return to Israel.
• The future Palestinian State will not be allowed to develop a military capability that can endanger Israeli security.

To the Israelis:

• Israel will have to evacuate almost all of the West Bank, with equivalent territorial exchanges for the remainder.
• Israel must relinquish much of East Jerusalem, in line with the formula “What is Arab will be Palestinian, what is Jewish will be Israeli.”
• Israel will have to accept some creative solution for the Temple Mount, which is not and will not be recognized under international law as under exclusive Israeli sovereignty.

Follow-Up

The original 242 called on the Secretary General to appoint a Special Representative to promote an agreement in line with the principles of the Resolution. What is needed today, is not a Special Representative, but a determination of the Council to pursue the issue.

The stance that the Council should take is that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is too important to the interests of regional and global peace to be left to just the Israelis and Palestinians. Rather than merely seeking to facilitate negotiations between the primary parties, the Council should convey its determination to move the conflict towards resolution. Such a Resolution will be taken most seriously if it is understood that the Council is open to more vigorous action if the parties remain intransigent.

The Stance of the United States

The Security Council cannot pass a New 242 if it is opposed by the United States. Would the U.S. block a resolution of the sort discussed above?

The answer to this may depend in part on who is president at the time. Substantively, the proposed New 242 is quite similar to the Clinton parameters of December 2000. The one clear exception is that the Clinton parameters called for Israel, even after land swaps, to give up something less than the equivalent of 100% of the West Bank. Subsequently, President Bush’s April 14, 2004 letter to Prime Minister Sharon stated that “it is unrealistic to expect the outcome of final status negotiations to be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949″ was initially seen as a move towards the Israeli stance on territory. But with the addition of his May 25, 2005 remarks welcoming President Abbas to the White House, in which he stated that “changes to the 1949 armistice lines must be mutually agreed to,” President Bush cancelled any such interpretation. Taken together the two messages suggest adjustments to the armistice lines that will only be possible with territorial swaps.

The real issue for the Bush Administration is not likely to be the proposed substance of a new 242, but whether the Administration sees reason to forcefully present hard truths to both sides, and whether it wants to use the Security Council for that purpose. One attraction that this might have for the U.S. is that is provides an appropriate response to the Arab Peace Initiative (API). The API can be understood as offering Israel normalization of relations with the Arab world if it concludes peace treaties based on the Arab interpretation of the territorial provisions of 242 (withdrawal from all of the territories), plus a settlement of the refugee issue in accord with UNGA Resolution 194.

In this regard, the New 242 could be viewed as a major move towards the Arab position on territory. In exchange, it would invoke what may be termed “the impracticability loophole” in UNGAR 194. Resolution 194 said that the refugees should be allowed to return to their homes “at the earliest practicable date.” It can be argued that after sixty years of conflict and physical transformation, no significant return is practicable now or in the future. Conceived in this way, unlike the API, the New 242 would speak hard but necessary truths to both sides.

Jerome M. Segal is the Director of the Peace Consultancy Project at the University of Maryland’s Center for International and Security Studies, and he is the President of the Jewish Peace Lobby.

May 20, 2007

The announcement of future U.S.-Iran talks focused on Iraq suggests the Bush administration may be revisiting its approach toward Tehran. The search for an effective policy toward Iran has proven elusive for successive U.S. and EU administrations. While U.S. attempts to change Iranian behavior – and, indeed, the Iranian regime — using political and economic coercion have not borne fruit, European attempts to use political and economic incentives have been similarly frustrating.

I. Iranian Realities

• Iran is integral to several issues of critical importance to U.S. and E.U. foreign policy, namely Iraq, non-proliferation, energy security, terrorism, and Arab-Israeli peace. In this context, ignoring Iran is not an option, attempting to contain it is unlikely to promote Western interests, and confronting it militarily would only worsen what the West seeks to improve. In short, there is no substitute for direct dialogue with Tehran.
• Despite widespread popular discontent, the Islamic Republic is not on the verge of collapse, and any reform movement will require time to revive. Having experienced a revolution and an eight-year war with Iraq, the unmet expectations of the Khatami era, and the horrors of what is currently taking place in Iraq, Iranians are wary of political agitation. Abrupt domestic change is unlikely in the near term and would not necessarily lead to an improvement, as currently the only groups which are both armed and organized are the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Bassij militia.
• Iran’s reintegration into the global economy and improved Iranian ties with the West will expedite political reform and dilute hardliners’ control. A small but powerful clique with entrenched economic and political interests in the status quo will do everything in their power to torpedo attempts at reconciliation with the United States.

• U.S. concerns about Iran did not originate with and are not limited to its nuclear ambitions. U.S. sanctions and policy were in place prior to the nuclear revelations, and have more to do with the nature of the Iranian regime than with its nuclear pursuits. For this and other reasons, the nuclear issue cannot be resolved without addressing broader points of contention and deep-seated mistrust between the two countries.

• Iran arguably has more common interests with the United States in Iraq than any of Iraq’s other neighbors. While much of the Arab world is concerned about Shia ascendancy in Iraq, Iran and the U.S both wish to promote Iraqi stability, territorial integrity and democracy.

II. The Difficulties of Engaging Iran:

Mistrust, Discord and Paralysis Iran’s leaders lack a clear consensus, whether concerning the country’s nuclear policy, relations with the U.S., or Iran’s regional role. This is due to internal discord, institutional paralysis, and above all a deep-seated mistrust of U.S. intentions.

• From the Islamic Republic’s inception in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini aimed to set up the revolutionary government’s power structure in a way which would be “impenetrable” to foreign influence. This meant creating multiple power centers whose competition would provide checks and balances to prevent one branch or individual from becoming too powerful and susceptible to outside influence. However, while Khomeini’s leadership rarely was questioned, Ayatollah Khamenei lacks the credentials and legitimacy of his predecessor, leading him to make decisions by consensus rather than by decree. The result has been considerable gridlock and political paralysis as well as a tendency to muddle along with entrenched policies.

• Ayatollah Khamenei’s 18 year track record suggests a risk averse leader — courting neither confrontation nor accommodation with the West-and paralyzed with mistrust. He believes the U.S. is not interested in changing Iran’s external behavior but the regime itself. In Khamenei’s world-view, the U.S. sees Iran’s strategic location and energy resources as too valuable to be controlled by an independent-minded Islamic government. As a result, Washington aspires to revert to the “patron-client” relationship with Iran that existed under the Shah. In this context, whether U.S. officials announce they want to talk to Iran or isolate it, Khamenei presumes nefarious intentions. Washington’s refusal to acknowledge or respond to Iran’s 2003 overture only reinforced Khamenei’s perceptions.

• At the same time Khamenei is weary of domestic rivals and will not take any foreign policy decision that risks hurting his political interests. The Clinton administration’s unsuccessful attempts to bypass Khamenei and engage Khatami and the reformists in 2000 are case in point.

• Because of this paralysis, the Islamic Republic historically has had a tendency to make critical decisions under duress. The decision to end the Iran-Iraq war (in the words of one former European diplomat in Iran, “the only major decision the regime has made in the last three decades”) was reached only after tremendous cost in blood and treasure and a fear that Washington intended to enter the war in support of Iraq. Likewise, the 2003 overture to the United States was made at a time when the regime feared the U.S. might set its sights on Tehran after Baghdad.

• Iran’s leadership also is acutely aware of the role of oil in politics. In this regard, it is going to have to make very hard decisions in coming years. Gasoline is heavily subsidized (at a cost of over $10 billion per year), the baby boom generation is entering the labor force, and the country is churning out automobiles, so there is growing consumption and little conservation. At the same time, oil production has been gradually decreasing due to a lack of investment in energy infrastructure projects. Given the uncertain political and business climate, foreign investment has diminished. If the regime continues at this pace–increased consumption and decreased output–within a decade the country could conceivably become a net oil importer.

This will force very painful decisions. Either the regime will have to cut gasoline subsidies and encourage conservation-a difficult task for a president who ran on a populist platform — or the leadership will have to alter its policies to attract outside investment. Most likely it will be a combination of both.

III. What Should Be Done?

The policy implications of the above observations pull in opposite directions. On one hand the analysis suggests internal political reform in Iran is highly unlikely as long as the country remains isolated, implying a need for engagement by the West. On the other hand, it suggests that Iran makes decisions only when compelled to do so, implying a need for a tough, “no nonsense” approach.

In fact, simultaneously presenting two distinct paths to Tehran may be the best way forward. It is necessary to make clear to Tehran that a hard-line approach is counterproductive and will only increase Iran’s isolation. Security Council resolutions and international political and financial pressure will not bring about a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear accord, but in the short-term they may be necessary tools.

At the same time, more pragmatic elements in Iran need to be able to argue with plausibility that a different Iranian approach will trigger a more positive Western response. Pragmatists currently complain that in the highly-charged international environment, their calls for moderation are easily dismissed as naïve and irresponsible.

Several guiding principles can be suggested:

• Any dialogue must be comprehensive – i.e., not limited to Iraq or the nuclear file only, and not limited to the EU; Iraq could be a good starting point given the two sides’ common interests.

• In the context of a diplomatic accommodation, the West acknowledges Iran’s right to a full fuel cycle. In return, Iran would agree that while it has every right to enrichment, it would not exercise this right until it receives a “clean bill of health” from the IAEA. Any eventual domestic uranium enrichment program should be delayed, closely monitored and limited, at least in the earlier stages.

• Iran should be explicitly but privately reassured that it will not incriminate itself for fully cooperating with the IAEA and admitting past transgressions in order to get a “clean bill of health.” Otherwise Iran will continue to have an incentive to obstruct and obfuscate as long as it senses that that the costs of cooperation exceed the costs of non-cooperation.

• More important than the precise technical details of any nuclear agreement-how long of a suspension, how many centrifuges, etc.- is for the U.S., E.U., Russia, China, and India to agree on a common approach. When it came to Iraq the U.S. was content with strong resolutions and a weak coalition; when it comes to Iran the key is – at the outset at least — mild resolutions in order to achieve and maintain a robust coalition.

• Russia is key. Iran is banking on the fact that a) Russia will not agree to substantive sanctions; b) China will follow Russia’s lead; and c) EU resolve will waver without Russian and Chinese support. If faced with a united front which includes Russia and China, however, Iran might recalculate its approach.

• Although Iran responds to pressure, it is unlikely to agree to any arrangement in which it is seen as admitting defeat or being forced to compromise. Besides the issue of saving face, many in Iran’s political elite-chiefly Ayatollah Khamenei–believe that this will only encourage the U.S. to exert greater pressure.

• The U.S. needs to clarify what a different Iranian policy would trigger on its part. It should provide a clear road-map to Iran as to how a normalization of relations between the two countries would be possible.

• Threatening military force against Iran is counterproductive. It weakens the position of Iranian moderates who strive to forge a different relationship with Washington and strengthens the argument of hardliners who advocate pursuing a nuclear weapon as a deterrent.

Karim Sadjadpour is an Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. A leading researcher on Iran, Sadjadpour has conducted dozens of interviews with senior Iranian officials, and hundreds with Iranian intellectuals, clerics, dissidents, paramilitaries, businessmen, students, activists, and youth, among others.