By James Dobbins

May 1, 2010

The Middle East has seen numerous peacekeeping operations over the past fifty years. Several continue to this day. For over three decades, a U.S.-led force in the Sinai has helped separate Israeli and Egyptian forces and maintain peace between these two states. On Israel’s northern border, a UN force in Lebanon seeks to prevent renewed fighting between Hezbollah militants and Israel. Helpful as these missions have been, they have done nothing to advance resolution of the core dispute between Israel and its Arab neighbors. They have not resolved the fate of the Palestinian population displaced when Israel was created in 1948 or determined the final status of the Palestinian territory occupied by Israel in 1967 but never incorporated into it.

Something more than inter-positional peacekeeping will be needed as part of any accord designed to resolve these core issues. Simply separating the Israeli and Palestinian populations will not be enough, because it is difficult to imagine a Palestinian state that could, immediately upon the signature of a peace agreement, proceed to effectively control its side of the divide and reliably guarantee faithful execution of that accord. The absence of such a state presents a classic chicken versus egg dilemma. There can be no Middle East peace without a Palestinian party capable of effectively controlling the territory under its control, yet no such Palestinian party can be created without a peace agreement. Experience has shown the challenges of establishing these two conditions sequentially. Israel will not end the occupation until it has a reliable negotiating partner, one capable of fulfilling whatever obligations it accepts, but such a Palestinian partner cannot be created under Israeli occupation. These two prerequisites for peace must be put in place more or less concurrently. Doing so will probably require some third party to help the emerging Palestinian state establish itself and at the same time assure Israelis that the peace accord will be faithfully implemented.

Though the nature of a hypothetical peacekeeping force in a new Palestinian state is fraught with uncertainty, it is possible to make well informed predictions about what circumstances would be likely to result in its creation. It seems unlikely that the United States or the rest of the international community would be willing to deploy troops into the Palestinian territories in order to garrison an Israeli occupation or to substitute for it. So a precondition for the deployment of such a force would be an end to that occupation. On the other hand, Israel appears unlikely to agree to a full transfer of sovereignty to a Palestinian state – particularly for functions potentially affecting the safety of the Israeli population, such as security and border control. Thus, an international mission designed to help keep an Israeli-Palestinian peace would need to combine both inter-positional and state-building functions. Certainly one of its responsibilities would be to help prevent incursions and other attacks by Palestinian extremists into Israel, thereby also forestalling Israeli military incursions into the Palestinian state. But the mission would also have to help that state develop the capacity to secure and effectively govern its own territory.

Many non-military elements of an international state-building mission are already in place. U.S., European and UN personnel have been working for some time to improve the quality of Palestinian governance. But these efforts are taking place in the midst of an ongoing military occupation run by an Israeli government that is unsure about whether it truly wants the emergence of a competent Palestinian state – particularly one capable of securing its own territory and population. The international community’s state-building programs are also being conducted in the midst of an ongoing conflict among the Palestinians themselves regarding the nature of their state and control over its institutions. External efforts to build more effective Palestinian institutions are unlikely to make adequate progress until both these impediments – Israeli ambivalence and Palestinian infighting – are removed or at least mitigated in a manner conducive to success.

Palestinian authorities will not want to trade an Israeli occupation for an international one, so international authority would need to be carefully delineated and substantially less sweeping than the current Israeli writ. External assistance in the field of state-building, on the other hand, is likely to be considerably more extensive than what is currently provided – both because the conditions will be more favorable and because with their troops on the ground and at risk, contributing nations will have a strong incentive to improve Palestinian institutional capacity to serve the Palestinian population and control its own territory.

Considerable buy-in would be necessary from both the Israeli and Palestinian sides before the United States or any other government would likely be willing to support such a mission. There is no strong constituency in the United States for coercing Israel to make peace. Nor is there likely to be any stomach among potential troop-contributing nations to force the Palestinians to do so. Thus, if such a mission is to take place, it is more likely to resemble recent UN-led post-conflict missions, which have had the assent of both sides, than the more robust NATO-led peace enforcement efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo – not to speak of the even more intense counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The UN is not a plausible candidate to lead this particular mission, however. Most UN members regard the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza to be, at best, unduly prolonged, and, at worst, illegitimate. Israel, by the same token, does not regard the United Nations as sufficiently impartial to undertake a mission so central to Israeli security. To garner the support of both of the key parties, therefore, it is more likely that the military component of any such international mission would need to be organized as a U.S.-led “coalition of the willing” or, perhaps more likely, by the NATO Alliance.

A plausible construct would thus be a NATO-led military component with a civilian-led parallel organization to handle political, governance and development matters. Both components would require the explicit consent of all the parties to the conflict, and their mandates would likely be embedded in the peace settlement. The governments involved would also likely seek and receive a parallel UN Security Council mandate. The international civilian leader would be appointed by a select group of interested countries, to include those contributing significantly to the NATO-led military force as well as those prepared to provide substantial economic assistance. These governments would also need to provide funding to allow the civilian leader to assemble a staff and to conduct a variety of advisory and assistance activities. This civilian leader would probably need some extraordinary powers deriving from the peace agreement and the accompanying Security Council resolution. Enforcement would largely depend upon voluntary compliance but would have to be backed by a willingness to employ NATO military force, or alternatively the threat to withdraw that force and risk an Israeli reoccupation.

Any peace settlement would fall apart if Israel were to be exposed to continued attacks from Palestinian territory, and these will occur unless the overwhelming majority of Palestinians support the settlement. Achieving peace among Palestinians will thus be essential to sustaining peace between Arabs and Israelis. Certainly there will be few international volunteers to man a peacekeeping mission in a Palestinian state at war with itself. Thus such a deployment will probably require agreement, not just between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, but also between the two major contenders for power in the new Palestinian state, Fatah and Hamas.

Summary

In sum, a peacekeeping force in Palestine is no substitute for agreement among the main Palestinian factions, and between them and Israel, but is a likely and perhaps essential component of such an accord. Although the United Nations is unlikely to be chosen to lead such a force, its experience in overseeing the implementation of a dozen or more similar such peace agreements over the past couple of decades, as well as NATO’s endeavors in Bosnia and Kosovo suggest that this is a feasible, if by no means a certain or easy endeavor.

* James Dobbins, a former Assistant Secretary of State, served throughout the 1990s as the Clinton administration’s Special Envoy for Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, and then as the Bush administration’s first Special Envoy for Afghanistan following 9/11. Since joining the RAND Corporation, where he heads the International Security and Defense Policy Center, he has produced a series of studies looking at the American, UN and European record of nation-building over the past sixty years.

The views expressed in US/MEPolicy Briefs are not necessarily shared by the U.S./Middle East Project.

December 11, 2007

In the lead-up to the Annapolis conference, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has been carefully studying past American attempts at Arab‐Israeli peacemaking. Has she drawn the right lessons from the U.S. diplomatic experience?

Given that the United States has been deeply engaged in the Middle East peace process for more than three decades, experiencing both historic achievements and spectacular failures, there is little need to reinvent the wheel. A group of former officials and scholars has just completed a year‐long series of intensive consultations with dozens of American, Israeli and Arab statesmen and political figures. Following are some of the lessons and recommendations that were identified:

First, U.S. involvement in the peace process must be defined – and seen, both at home, and abroad‐‐as a top White House priority. If the parties sense anything less, they will either ignore or try to subvert American involvement. President Bushʹs speech at Annapolis went a long way toward dispelling the notion that Washington has its mind elsewhere. But there was too much silence between the July announcement and Bushʹs speech in late November, leading some to doubt the intensity of presidential commitment. President Bush will not (and

should not) allow himself to be drawn into the day‐to‐day negotiations, as his predecessor was. But without periodic, unambiguous signals of presidential commitment, the current U.S. initiative risks faltering.

Second, the U.S. must ensure that Palestinians and Israelis move beyond an incremental approach and focus on ending their conflict. In theory, Annapolis ‐‐ with its emphasis on launching final status negotiations – reflects an understanding of this necessity. In practice, however, the Administration continues to resist the notion of U.S. engagement on the most sensitive core issues, preferring a hands‐off approach. Such a conclusion draws the wrong lessons from the past. Over the years, Washington’s most important achievements have come when it was prepared to take risks and delve into the substantive issues that divided Arabs and Israelis. Annapolis demonstrated that, left to their own devices, the parties cannot take the final step and agree to bold compromises. Indeed, they were unable to agree on the general outlines of a negotiated settlement; their joint ʺunderstandingʺ failed even to list the core issues. Past successes, together with Annapolis’s failure in this regard, underscore the necessity for the U.S., at some future point, to put forward bridging proposals.

Third, the U.S. needs to involve key international and regional actors. Arab states were invited to Annapolis, an indication that the Bush Administration understands there is an opportunity to build a regional structure of support for peace with Israel. This is essential for two reasons: regional support provides political cover to Palestinian leaders while simultaneously offering Israel the prospect of broader normalization – a goal Israeli and Jewish leaders have long sought. For Arab support to be sustained and deepened, however, meaningful progress will have to be made both at the negotiating table and on the ground.

A key question revolves around Syria. Having succeeded in bringing Damascus to Annapolis, the Bush Administration should now test Syria’s and Israel’s interest in renewed negotiations. The more Syria develops a stake in this new diplomatic process, the less it will have an incentive to undermine it. Expanding dialogue with Damascus beyond the issue of Iraq remains a highly controversial matter within the Administration, as some officials fear such engagement will come at the expense of Lebanon’s sovereignty. But that is not inevitable. It should be possible for the U.S. and its European allies to engage Syria, support the Lebanese government, maintain stability along the Lebanese‐Israeli border and stand behind the UN tribunal.

Fourth, the U.S. should closely monitor developments on the ground. If there is one lesson that ought to be learned from the past, it is that even the most vaunted diplomatic process cannot long survive without genuine improvements in Palestinian and Israeli lives. This in turn requires a far more serious effort by Washington to monitor and assess each side’s compliance with its commitments. Former policy makers unanimously recognized that U.S. failure to establish strict accountability by the two parties had been corrosive, eroding mutual confidence, undermining U.S. standing and allowing destructive developments to proceed unchecked.

When the Road Map was first introduced in 2003, Washington committed itself to monitoring implementation,

going so far as to dispatch an envoy. But the mission quickly was aborted. The Annapolis statement suggests the Administration may have drawn the right lessons in this regard, insofar as it calls on the U.S. to judge the parties’ implementation of their Road Map obligations. The Administration now needs to demonstrate its commitment and willingness to assess impartially Palestinian and Israeli performance.

Fifth, the U.S. must stand fast, even in the face of political obstacles. At various times, rejectonists in Israel or among the Palestinians will seek to derail this new initiative. As this occurs, Washington must stay the course. To be sure, the Administration will have to keep a close eye on local developments in both entities. But, equally crucially, no actor should be allowed a veto over the process. From the early 1990s onwards, U.S. diplomacy has tended to pay too much attention to Israeli domestic developments, while paying too little to Palestinian domestic developments. This time, the Administration should seek a better balance, understanding political realities and constraints, but not being paralyzed by them.

Annapolis offers an important opportunity to turn the page, generating momentum on the ground, at the negotiating table and in the region. Drawing the right lessons from past negotiations will be critical to transforming this opportunity into reality.

Together with Ambassador Daniel C. Kurtzer, Scott Lasensky is co-author of “Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace,” which will be published this winter by the United States Institute of Peace Press. Lasensky is a Senior Researcher at the United States Institute of Peace, and Acting Vice President of the Institute’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. He served as Assistant Director of the U.S./Middle East Project from 2000-2003. These views are his own.

November 10, 2007

The litany of bad news from the Middle East seems to grow by the week. In Iraq, the U.S. is failing to turn the tide, Turkey prepares to move against the PKK in the north while the Kurdish, Shiite and Sunni communities are on a collision course concerning control over Kirkuk. Millions of Iraqis have fled their country as refugees, adding an element of instability that will last for years. The debate about a U.S. strike against Iran is well underway in Washington and Israel has already conducted air‐strikes against Syria. Palestinian militants and the IDF have not stopped fighting, Gaza is suffering the twin evils of the siege and poor governance, and a major Israeli incursion may be just around the corner. Fault lines cut across Lebanon atop of which sit an EU‐UN peacekeeping force. In short, the human suffering in the region is extensive and worsening. These violent conflicts are drawing ever closer to each other and to Europe.

Yet, apparently, European leaders still do not feel the motivation to act.

When our two organizations held a roundtable discussion with over 25 Middle East experts from across Europe last month, we discovered real dismay over Europe’s policy drift. European engagement with Iran seems to have been pursued for its own sake, rather than with a clear strategy in mind. Taxpayers in the EU and associated countries (like Norway and Switzerland) were the largest donors in a $10‐billion peace‐building effort in Palestine which, it now seems clear, will not have a sustained impact without an end to the occupation. The Barcelona process on Mediterranean integration presumed a correlation between democracy and trade‐led growth, yet the region is on a path of increased growth, failing democracy and no dialogue with Europe on critical security issues such as nuclear proliferation. Meanwhile, the EU apparently believes it has virtually no influence over Turkey in its conflict with the Kurds, while the Quartet’s principles have prevented Europe from engaging with Hamas in support of peace‐making efforts made by Saudi Arabia and others.

In short, at a time when the region is in desperate need of constructive diplomatic action, Europe seems satisfied with following the U.S. lead. The transatlantic relationship has trumped the relationship between Europe and its neighbors, leading to a paralysis in European policy.

The absence of robust and independent European diplomacy is a bad thing. Here’s why:

Rising instability: Both sides of the Atlantic have witnessed a sharp and rapid decline in their ability to influence global events. This results from the reemergence of China, India and Russia in an increasingly multi‐polar world. In the Middle East, the U.S. – long the dominant regional power – has been severely weakened by its Iraq adventure. Regional powers – notably Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Syria – are all seeking to fill that vacuum in line with their narrow interests. Virtually no one in the region believes the U.S.‐led conference in Annapolis will stabilize an increasingly shaky regional system. Indeed, many at the roundtable feared that the Israel‐Palestinian conflict once again would turn into an “existential conflict” ‐‐ not unlike the period preceding the 1967 war, only this time in a far more fragmented and violent context. Meaningful European engagement in this period of dangerous transition is badly needed.

Responding to transnational violence: Current U.S. and European policies are not suited to deal with one of the more potent manifestations of this instability, the rise of transnational violence. The single‐minded emphasis on security in European domestic and foreign policies has proceeded on the assumption that there is no connection between violence and political grievances. This has led to further polarization, feeding regional conflicts rather than mitigating them. It has meant taking sides in Iraq, between Israel and Palestine, among Palestinians and among Lebanese; it also has meant lining up against Syria and Iran. Adopting one or two of those postures might be sustainable at any one time; taking all of them at once is not. Worse, it validates the view of many that the U.S. and Europe are determined to subjugate the region and is used as justification for resort to politically‐motivated violence. For Europe to focus on security alone – both at home and abroad – to the exclusion of a coherent diplomatic strategy aimed at addressing grievances contributes to the dynamics which perpetuate transnational violence.

Protecting European interests: To a large extent, the U.S. is ignoring European interests on key regional issues. On Iraq, Iran and Israel‐Palestine, the key debates are occurring in Washington; European leaders are being asked – and typically agree – simply to follow. In Lebanon as with Syria, European diplomacy is severely constrained by hawkish U.S. policies despite the fact that European (not American) soldiers are deployed in Lebanon. As a result, Europe is forsaking its traditional role as an actor with its own diplomacy and intent on defending certain moral values; worse, it is forsaking its basic obligation to protect its interests.

Participants in the Madrid roundtable voiced considerable skepticism concerning the possibility of an independent European regional diplomacy, in part because there is as yet little domestic pressure for such a role. Yet they also emphasized that a more active and constructive approach was a vital European interest given the interconnection between foreign policy (energy, trade, the Middle East peace process) and domestic issues (such as migration and the ripple effects of Mideast conflicts on Muslim communities across the continent). In the absence of an independent voice and policy, Europe increasingly is exposed to violence by those seeking to express opposition to the U.S.

Although Europe consistently asserts the need for diplomatic solutions, it lacks a coherent diplomatic strategy of its own. Some of this stems from institutional obstacles facing the Common Foreign and Security Policy; even so, both EU and associated states should be able to do more and better, whether individually or collectively.

Diplomacy now: Europe has seemed content to allow further regional polarization, awaiting the resumption of diplomacy at an as-of-yet undefined time in the future. But the passage of time is not neutral or harmless. In Israel‐Palestine, it exercises a pernicious influence, both because Israeli policies undermine the likelihood of a viable Palestinian state and because the Palestinian national movement is gradually disintegrating. In Iraq, Turkey’s actions in the north risk dragging Europe into the conflict in new ways. A U.S. confrontation with Iran could have devastating implications for the safety of European troops in Lebanon.

Conflict resolution or use of force? European decision makers need to decide whether to stand aside as the region drifts toward a generalized conflagration, or whether to use the full range of their diplomatic tools to try to stop the slide. Israel’s air‐strikes against Syria were met with a deafening silence, which in the present context amounts to a green light for further attacks. Is this Europe’s policy? If so, does it mean that its diplomacy has moved from a commitment to Israel’s existence and security towards blind acceptance of Israel’s policies? Given the trajectory of U.S and Israeli policy, Europe must decide whether and where to draw the line.

Likewise, Europe must acknowledge that conflict resolution is above all a political enterprise. Economic projects and institution‐building in Palestine, however valuable, are sideshows in regard to the fundamental challenge of finding a political solution to a political conflict.

Inclusion, not exclusion: European policy should be based on an inclusive approach and in particular ought not to support policies based on the exclusion of significant actors. This is the rationale behind Norway’s and Switzerland’s approach to Lebanon and Palestine, where they have sought to promote national reconciliation rather than further divide the polities. In contrast the EU, constrained by ill‐advised Quartet principles, was unable to react constructively to the Mecca Agreement between Fatah and Hamas.

Security dialogue: The region is in desperate need of an inclusive, longer‐term security dialogue, modeled, perhaps, on the CSCE (the precursor to the modern‐day OSCE) and Europe is ideally suited to convene it. A regional security framework is needed to regulate the situation in the Gulf, between Israel and Syria and in order to deal with the risk of nuclear proliferation. This is all the more important because the overall regional environment directly affects the safety of EU peacekeepers in Lebanon and could lead to a larger conflagration.

A norms‐based approach: A traditional source of strength for European diplomacy has been its grounding in international law and norms. From Iraq to Israel, Europe should insist on evenhanded adherence to such principles as the best way to defend human rights and human security. This would require Europe to engage Israel on its settlement policy or its Gaza siege, just as it would require it to engage with Palestinian factions and Hezbollah to get them to end their rocket attacks against Israeli civilians. Moreover, EU trade instruments should be linked explicitly to EU human rights legislation; this could be followed up at the administrative level by denying European companies working in Israeli settlements access to EU procurement contracts.

In the same spirit, European diplomacy should adhere to fair and defensible principles. Together with Arab states, it should argue strongly for a resolution of the Arab‐Israeli conflict on the basis of UN resolution and the Arab Peace Initiative. It should authorize European diplomats to engage with Palestinian armed groups with the aim of managing internal conflict and bringing them into the peace process in ways that will bolster security for Israeli citizens. It should take the position that, in the event of failure on the part of Israelis and Palestinians to reach an agreement, occupation is not a permanent default position: the preambles of both UN Resolutions 242 and 338 affirm the illegitimacy of acquiring territory by force. At the same time, a European approach should recognize that Palestinian statehood coupled with de facto Israeli control (as in the Gaza Strip) is not sustainable.

Participants in the Madrid roundtable were highly skeptical that any of this was politically viable at present. Yet they also recognized that the region needs an independent European voice as never before. This is likely to remain the case for as long as the U.S. pursues policies that polarize the region and fail to create the political space necessary for parties at war – or on the brink of war – to seek common ground through negotiations. Europe cannot become a substitute for the U.S. Still, as a series of interrelated conflicts looms, it is high time for it to play a more active and constructive role lest it find itself a passive witness to, and a principal victim of, dangerous and misguided policies.

* Mariano Aguirre is Director of Peace, Security and Human Rights at the Fundacion para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Dialogo Exterior (FRIDE) in Madrid. Mark Taylor is Deputy Managing Director of the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies, Oslo. The authors wish to thank participants in the “The Roundtable of European Policy Researchers on the Middle East”, 19 October, 2007 in Madrid. The Roundtable was co-organized by the Spanish think-tank FRIDE and the Fafo Institute from Norway. While we have drawn heavily on the Roundtable discussion, the views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone.

THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THE US/MEPOLICY BRIEFS REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THEIR AUTHORS, NOT NECESSARILY THOSE OF THE U.S./MIDDLE EAST PROJECT.